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 SOME REFLECTIONS ON POPPER´S APPROACH TO RATIONALITY AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
Abstract: 
There are two different notions of human rationality in Popper´s work: the notion that stems 
from his evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning (PTKL), and the notion embodied 
in his methodological proposal for the social sciences known as `Situational Analysis´ (SA). 
This essay provides an in-depth critical analysis of the relation between these two 
approaches and its implications for the social sciences. In particular, we focus on (i) the 
difference between PTKL and both the `objectivist´ and `subjectivist´ version of SA, (ii) 
Schumpeter´s distinction between the `rationality of the observer´ and the `rationality in the 
observed´, and (iii) Hayek´s arguments about the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences. 
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ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES ACERCA DEL ENFOQUE POPPERIANO SOBRE LA 
RACIONALIDAD Y SUS IMPLICACIONES PARA LAS CIENCIAS SOCIALES 
 
Resumen: 
Existen dos nociones distintas sobre la racionalidad humana en la obra filosófica de Popper: 
la derivada de la teoría popperiana del conocimiento y el aprendizaje (TPCA) y la noción 
implícita en su propuesta metodológica para las Ciencias Sociales conocida como "Análisis 
Situacional" (AS). Este ensayo realiza un análisis crítico detallado de la relación entre estas 
dos nociones y de sus implicaciones para las ciencias sociales. En concreto, el ensayo 
aborda: (i) las diferencias entre TPCA y las versiones "objetivista" y "subjetivista" de AS, 
(ii) la distinción propuesta por Schumpeter entre la "racionalidad del observador y la 
"racionalidad del observado" y (iii) los argumentos de Hayek sobre la naturaleza de los 
"hechos" en las Ciencias Sociales.  . 
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON POPPER´S APPROACH TO RATIONALITY 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES  
 
1. Introduction  
Discussions by both philosophers of science and social science methodologists 
on Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences known as `Situational 
Analysis´ (SA) have focused either on its (in)compatibility with falsification (Hands, 
1985, 1991, 1992; Notturno, 1998; Hedström et al., 1998) or on its interpretation.1 In 
the former case, the debate has revolved around Popper´s confession (Popper, 1994, ch. 
8) that his `rationality principle´ (RP), i.e., the notion that in the construction of models 
in the social sciences we must assume that actors´ behaviour is adequate or appropriate 
to their problem-situation (P-S), is false but nevertheless a good enough approximation 
to the truth (Popper, 1985).2 This surprising confession by a philosopher of science 
whose academic reputation grew out of the formulation of a demarcation criterion for 
scientific hypotheses based on the requirement that the latter be potentially falsified has 
led some commentators to argue that Popper´s methodological proposal for the social 
sciences and, specifically, his RP is incompatible with the criterion of refutability as 
prescribed for the natural sciences.3 Some critics even argue that such incompatibility 
severely undermines Popper´s claim to methodological monism in the natural and the 
social sciences. Other critics have accused him of reintroducing a pure instrumentalism 
à la Friedman (1953) due to his methodological advice to immunize RP from potential 
refutation and of `contradicting his own explicit rejection of instrumentalist pretences to 
knowledge´ (Oakley, 1999, p. 32).  
                                                 
1 General criticisms of Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences can be found in Latsis 
(1983), Hands, (1985), Bunge (1996), Oakley (1999, 2002), and Vanberg (2002).  
 
2 Recently, another version of RP has been proposed in Lagueux (2006, pp. 201-202) who suggests that, 
given the fact that refinements in model-construction in the social sciences imply that theoretical models 
exhibit more detailed descriptions of the situation, RP may also be enunciated as implying that `the agent 
will agree with what is clearly presented by the model itself as the appropriate thing to do´. Be that as it 
may, for the purpose of this study we focus hereafter on Popper´s version of RP.   
  
3 These ideas were expounded in his famous Logic of Scientific Discovery. That said, and as far as the 
social sciences are concerned, there is some consensus on the notion that it is not ‘falsificationism’ per se 
but ‘critical rationalism’ ― of which falsification is only one possibility ― that is the true message of 
Popper´s philosophy (Caldwell, 1991; Notturno, 1998; Boland, 2003a). According to Hands (1991, p. 
114), who nevertheless remains sceptical of this interpretation, `critical rationalism´ is an interpretation of 
Popperian philosophy due primarily to Bartley (1982).  
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As for the interpretation of RP, the debate has centred on its role and status. For 
instance, Latsis (1983, p. 132) argues that `Popper´s account of the role and status of the 
rationality principle is obscure and unsatisfactory´. He shows that, in different parts of 
his work, Popper notes that RP is `almost empty´, `not a priori valid´, `clearly false´, `a 
good approximation to the truth´, and `the consequence of a methodological postulate´ 
(op. cit., p. 133). According to him, the role of RP is to function as a `plastic interface´ 
between mental states and behaviour and this is the reason why it is declared by Popper 
to be false but close to the truth (op. cit., p. 140). Specifically, RP is false if interpreted 
in a literal way because it does not determine behaviour in a `cast-iron´ fashion but is 
close to the truth because it captures the tendency of human behaviour to follow the 
logic dictated by P-S.4 Crucially, he distinguishes between an `objectivist´ (RPo) and a 
`subjectivist´ version (RPs), and associates the former with Pareto (1917, section 150) 
and Parsons (1937, p. 58), and the latter with Popper himself. If RPo is adopted, the 
theoretician reconstructs the `objective´ P-S in an oversimplified way whereas, if RPs is 
adopted, P-S is reconstructed as it is seen by the actors.  
Building on Latsis´ distinction between RPo and RPs, Nadeau (1993) discusses 
the role of RP in Popper (1985) and maintains that RPo is clearly false because actors´ 
behaviour is not always adequate to the `objective´ P-S whereas RPs is irrefutable and, 
hence, it can only be interpreted as a metaphysical statement (op. cit., p. 459). He then 
states that RPs is the correct interpretation since `the rationality principle that Popper 
puts at the theoretical core of all social sciences looks more like a “synthetic a priori 
truth or pure reason” in the domain of social reality than like an empirical law of 
nature´. Nevertheless, when asked to clarify whether RP is a `methodological principle´ 
or an `empirical conjecture´, Popper explains that `[t]his second case is precisely the one 
that corresponds to my own view of the status of the rationality principle: I regard the 
principle of adequacy of action (that is the rationality principle) as an integral part of 
every, or nearly every, testable social theory´ (Popper, 1994, p. 177). In other words, he 
views RP as an integral part of any empirical theory in the social sciences and, more 
specifically, as the animating part, just as the laws of motion of planets are an integral 
part of Newton´s gravitational theory. In an attempt to make sense of all this, Lagueux 
                                                 
4 In his analysis of the role and status of RP Latsis (1983) focuses on Popper´s analysis of the `mind-body 
problem´, that is, the analysis of the manner in which mental states affect behaviour as discussed in his 
paper `Of Clouds and Clocks´ (Popper, 1966). According to Latsis (1983, p. 139), RP represents Popper´s 
compromise solution to this problem whereby it is suggested that `our mental states control some of our 
behaviour and that this control is “of a plastic kind”´  
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(2006, p. 203) argues that a methodological principle cannot be a part of a scientific 
theory whose constituent parts must be empirical rather than a priori. Yet, according to 
him, if RP cannot be a methodological principle, `the decision to immunize it can 
nonetheless be considered as based on a methodological principle´ (see Notturno, 1998, 
pp. 405-408). Although he uses a different terminology — methodological `rule´ instead 
of methodological `principle´ — de Bruin (2006, p. 213) also explains that the decision 
to adopt RP is a methodological rule according to which `one should always try to 
explain human behaviour in terms of reasons´. However, he adds that `there are good 
reasons to doubt whether the kind of principle of rationality that Popper discusses is 
really empirical at all… one could as well phrase it as a metaphysical principle that all 
actions have reasons´ (de Bruin, 2006, p. 216, emphasis added).  
 Despite the fact that some commentators have noted that there are two different 
notions of rationality in Popper´s philosophy, there has been very little discussion about 
the relation of RP and Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning (PTKL). 
The essence of Popper´s theory of knowledge is that all knowledge is conjectural and 
that we can never prove that a hypothesis is true albeit sometimes it is possible to prove 
that it is wrong. Likewise, the essence of Popper´s evolutionary theory of learning is 
that all living organisms (including human beings) learn by virtue of an imperfect and 
unending process that consists of subjecting their conjectures or hypotheses to trial and 
eliminating those ones which turn out to be erroneous while keeping provisionally those 
ones that are not falsified (Popper, 1963, p. 312).5 In other words, our knowledge grows 
in a `negative´ sense by discarding erroneous conjectures through a process of trial and 
error-elimination. As a result of it, an implication of PTKL is that the most important 
feature of knowledge is its fallibility. A second element of Popper´s theory of learning 
is that the learning process is always imperfect insofar as it never reaches an optimum 
adaptation to the surrounding environment.  
Now, a number of critics have referred to the apparent duality in Popper´s notion 
of rationality. To be sure, Popper (1985, p. 365; 1994, p. 181) distinguishes between 
rationality as a personal attitude — which he defines as the attitude of readiness to 
correct one´s beliefs when they turn out to be wrong — and his RP which, according to 
him, has nothing to do with the assumption that men are rational in this sense. Further, 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, as mentioned in Langlois (1995, footnote 8), Hayek (1967, p. 84) associates the notion of 
rationality in economics to the ability to `learn from experience´ which is very close to PTKL.   
   
 4
when he presents SA as his methodological proposal for the social sciences he writes 
that `when we speak of “rational behaviour” or of “irrational behaviour” then we mean 
behaviour which is, or is not, in accordance with the logic of the situation´ (Popper, 
[1943a] 1966, p. 97; 1944-45, sections 31 & 32). Be that as it may, Kerstenetzky (2009, 
p. 202) argues that the demarcation line between rationality and irrationality in Popper 
is the incorrigibility of one´s beliefs. That is, human behaviour is `rational´ if we are 
willing to correct our wrong beliefs and `irrational´ if otherwise. Similarly, Lagueux 
(2006, p. 202) points out that it is the `tendency to correct oneself by criticism´ that 
represents true rationality in Popper whereas Vanberg (2002, p. 19) remarks that, on the 
one hand, Popper presents RP as the methodological foundation for the social sciences 
but, in other parts of his work, he sketches out a framework for the analysis of human 
behaviour that relies on a different approach at purposeful behaviour that he defines as 
`conjecture-based problem-solving behaviour´. Finally, the conflict between the view of 
human agency depicted in PTKL and SA is also noted by Oakley (1999, p. 25; 2002, p. 
468).  
 The main purpose of this essay is to analyse the compatibility or otherwise of 
these two seemingly different notions of rationality in Popper´s work. In the process, we 
will make five claims. Our first claim is that there is a certain tension between PTKL 
and SA when their relation is analysed from the standpoint of the `rationality of the 
agents´ whose behaviour the theoretician seeks to capture in a situational model albeit 
the tension disappears when the relation is treated from the standpoint of the `rationality 
of the theoretician´. Our second claim is that the nature of the tension between PTKL 
and SA depends on whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist´ or the `subjectivist´ 
version of SA. In particular, we will argue below that the tension between PTKL and the 
`subjectivist´ version stems from the fact that, in the latter, it is implicitly assumed that 
agents´ view of P-S is, at least partially, wrong which implies that agents do not tend to 
eliminate their mistakes as PTKL posits. By contrast, we will argue that the tension 
between PTKL and the `objectivist´ version of SA stems from the fact that: (i) if agents 
behave according to PTKL it is not necessarily the case that their decisions will be 
adequate or appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ because the former only implies 
that agents tend to eliminate their (past) mistakes and, hence, in the wake of changes in 
the surrounding environment agents´ decisions may be inadequate to the `logic of the 
(new) situation´, and (ii) adoption of the `objectivist´ SA implies de facto the imposition 
of the theoretician´s view of P-S on agents´ but it is unlikely that if agents behave 
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according to PTKL their view of P-S will converge to the theoreticians´. Our third claim 
builds on the ideas of Hayek (1943) about the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences 
and is that, in the way it is presented by Popper and his commentators, the `objectivist´ 
version of SA represents a limit case which presupposes that P-S is (fully) independent 
of agents´ beliefs. Our fourth claim is closely related to the previous one and consists of 
the idea that, if Hayek´s ideas are accepted, it follows that the natural strategy for social 
scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as agents´ see it. Our fifth and last claim is that, 
unlike what Popper and some of his commentators suggest, the difference between the 
`objectivist´ and the `subjectivist´ version of SA is not that in the former the theoretician 
reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, 
rather that in the former the theoretician seeks to  reconstruct P-S as she sees it whereas 
in the latter she does it as she believes agents see it. The content of the essay is as 
follows. The following section introduces PTKL. In section 3, we expound Popper´s SA. 
In section 4, we discuss the duality in Popper´s notion of rationality by addressing: (i) 
the implications of adopting either the `objectivist´ or the `subjectivist´ version of SA, 
(ii) Hayek´s ideas about the `facts´ of the social sciences, (iii) a reformulation of the 
`objectivist´ and `subjectivist´ version of SA that takes on board Hayek´s ideas on the 
methodology of the social sciences, and (iv) the division line between `rational´ and 
`irrational´ behaviour in PTKL and SA. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes.     
 
2. Popper’s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning 
Inductive inference is reasoning from the past observed behaviour of objects to 
their future behaviour. The ‘problem of induction’ was originally raised by David Hume 
(1748) who pondered whether inductive evidence can go beyond the available evidence 
in order to predict future events. He argued that past evidence can tell us only about past 
experience. Hume's main argument was that we cannot rationally justify the claim that 
nature will continue to be uniform merely because it has been in the past, as this is using 
the sort of reasoning (i.e., induction) that is under question, i.e., it would be circular 
reasoning. Hume (op. cit.) also noticed that we tend to believe that phenomena behave 
in a regular fashion, that is, that certain patterns in the behaviour of objects persist into 
the future.  
Next, Popper defines the philosophical ‘problem of induction’ as the problem of 
providing a rational justification for the belief that the future will be (largely) like the 
past (Popper, 1972, p. 2). He identifies two problems in Hume´s criticism of induction: 
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(i) a logical problem (HL), and (ii) a psychological problem (HP). First, Hume´s HL is 
whether we are justified in reasoning from repeated instances of which we have some 
experience to other instances of which we have no experience. Hume´s answer to HL is 
negative no matter how many repetitions of the instances there are. Second, Hume´s HP 
is why, notwithstanding it, all reasonable people believe that instances of which they 
have no experience at all will conform to those of which they have experience. Hume´s 
answer to HP is that ‘the psychological mechanism of association forces them to 
believe, by custom or habit, that what happened in the past will happen in the future’ 
(op. cit., p. 90). According to Popper, this explains why Hume abandoned rationalism 
and viewed man as a product of blind habit. By contrast, Popper argues that there is no 
such thing as induction by repetition either in psychology or science: 
 
‘We do not act upon repetition or “habit”, but upon the best tested of our 
theories which… are the ones for which we have good rational reasons; not of course 
good reasons for believing them to be true, but for believing them to be the best 
available from the point of view of a search for truth or verisimilitude… The central 
question for Hume was: do we act according to reason or not? And my answer is: Yes.’ 
(op. cit., p. 95) 
 
Popper restates Hume´s problem of induction as follows. First, he denies that a 
theory can be simply justified by assuming the truth of certain observation statements. 
Rather, he insists that all theories are hypotheses and, hence, they can be overthrown 
(op. cit., p. 13). Further, he states that paradoxically induction is inductively invalid, that 
is, the claim that induction is a legitimate way to acquire (true) knowledge needs to be 
supported by a ‘higher’ principle that has, in its turn, been established inductively. But 
this strategy ultimately leads us into an infinite regress insofar as we will endlessly need 
to resort to a superior principle that has been discovered through induction. Second, he 
puts forward the proposition that the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false 
can be justified by the truth of certain observation statements (op. cit., p. 7). As the 
typical example goes, no matter how many white swans we come across, the finding of 
just one black swan will lead to the rejection of the universal statement ‘all swans are 
white’. Consequently, he urges scientists to construct severe tests that help detect false 
theories so that, by a method of elimination, they may eventually hit upon a true theory 
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even though we can never establish its truth (op. cit., pp. 14-15).6 Thus, he argues that 
there is an asymmetry between verification and falsification; any conjecture may be true 
or false but even if it turns out to be true, there is no way we can ever prove it (op. cit., 
p. 12). According to Popper, the method of science is ‘the method of bold conjectures 
and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (op. cit., p. 81). Since all theories 
involve universal statements, we can only ‘learn’ by proving that our knowledge is 
false. Specifically, learning takes place either when we reject one´s prior theory or when 
we are forced to adjust one´s theory in a way that recognizes that in its prior version it 
was false (op. cit, p. 81). In short, Popper´s ideas on scientific methodology can be seen 
as a sub-product of PTKL:  
 
`Although I shall confine my discussion to the growth of knowledge in science, 
my remarks are applicable without much change, I believe, to the growth of pre-
scientific knowledge also — that is to say, to the general way in which men, and even 
animals, acquire new factual knowledge about the world. The method of learning by 
trial and error — of learning from our mistakes — seems to be fundamentally the same 
whether it is practised by lower or by higher animals, by chimpanzees or by men of 
science. My interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the 
theory of knowledge in general. Yet the study of the growth of scientific knowledge is, I 
believe, the most fruitful way of studying the growth of knowledge in general. For the 
growth of scientific knowledge may be said to be the growth of ordinary human 
knowledge writ large´ (Popper, 1963, p. 216). 
 
and, elsewhere, he writes:  
 
`Organisms evolve by trial and error, and their erroneous trials ― their 
erroneous mutations ― are eliminated, as a rule, by the elimination of the organism 
which is the “carrier” of the error. It is this part of my epistemology that, in man, 
through the evolution of a descriptive and argumentative language, all this has changed 
radically. Man has achieved the possibility of being critical of his own tentative trials, 
of his own theories. These theories are no longer incorporated in his organism, or in his 
                                                 
6 Popper adopted Tarski´s theory that truth is correspondence with the facts or with reality (Popper, 1972, 
p. 44). 
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genetic system: they may be formulated in books, or in journals; and they can be 
critically discussed, and shown to be erroneous, without killing any authors or burning 
any books: without destroying the “carriers”… critical reason is the only alternative to 
violence so far discovered´ (Popper, [1943b] 1966, p. 292).   
 
Third, Popper argues that theories are genetically incorporated into all our sense 
organs and this predisposes us to discriminate a priori between relevant or absorbable 
input and input that can be ignored (Popper, 1972, p.72). For instance, sense organs like 
the eye only react to those selected environmental events which they ‘expect’. However, 
according to him, this prior knowledge cannot be the result of observation; it must be 
the result of adaptation to the surrounding environment by trial and error. He claims that 
99 percent of the knowledge of all living organisms is inborn and incorporated into our 
biochemical constitution (Popper, 1990, p. 46). Furthermore, he argues that there is no 
theory-free language to help us interpret external data because primitive theories emerge 
together with language. Therefore, there is no such thing as pure perception since all 
languages are theory-impregnated (Popper, 1972, p. 145). This leads him to reject any 
epistemology which chooses our ‘direct’ observations and perceptions as the starting 
point; the fact that theories are built into our sense organs implies that ‘the epistemology 
of induction breaks down even before taking its first step’ (op. cit, p. 146).  
Lastly, Popper´s rejection of Hume´s inductive theory of beliefs formation leads 
him to maintain that ‘logical’ considerations may be duly transferred to ‘psychological’ 
considerations. According to him, not only do we reason rationally and thus contrary to 
the principle of induction, but we also behave rationally. He labels this the ‘principle of 
transference’ (op. cit, p. 6). By applying this conjecture to human psychology he then 
arrives at the method of trial and error-elimination in which the trials correspond to the 
formation of competing hypotheses whereas the elimination of errors corresponds to the 
refutation of (false) hypotheses. In other words, he proposes the theory that individuals 
do not really think in an inductive way but rather form their beliefs by eliminating false 
hypotheses. The theory of knowledge and learning that thus emerges is evolutionary. 
However, such theory implies that adaptation is always ‘imperfect’:  
 
‘Some of the errors that have entered the inheritable constitution of an organism 
are eliminated by eliminating their bearer; that is, the individual organism. But some 
 9
errors escape, and this is one reason why we are all fallible: our adaptation to the 
environment is never optimal, and it is always imperfect’ (Popper, 1990, p. 47). 
 
Further, Popper asserts that no equilibrium state of adaptation is reached by the 
application of the method of trial and error-elimination since (i) no optimal trial solution 
to any specific problem is likely to be offered, and (ii) the emergence of new structures 
and instructions involves a continuous change in the environmental situation (Popper, 
1994, p. 4). More specifically, and crucially, Popper presents the growth of knowledge 
as bringing in its wake changes in the surrounding environment: 
 
‘Our very understanding of the world changes the conditions of the changing 
world; and so do our wishes, our preferences, our motivations, our hopes, our dreams, 
our fantasies, our hypotheses, our theories. Even our erroneous theories change the 
world, although our correct theories may, as a rule, have a more lasting influence. All 
this amounts to the fact that determinism is simply mistaken’ (Popper, 1990, p. 17). 
 
In short, Popper makes it clear that the past affects but does not determine the 
future, i.e., the future is not pre-determined. That is, the future is ‘objectively open’ (op. 
cit., pp. 17-18). As noted in Vanberg (2002, p. 8), Popper´s theory of knowledge and 
learning exhibits a remarkable similarity to the arguments developed by biologist Mayr 
(1988) in the sense that both Popper and Mayr argue that intentional problem-solving 
behaviour can be interpreted as behaviour governed by programs or conjectures which 
are the product of evolutionary learning by trial and error-elimination. As Vanberg (op. 
cit.) explains, this approach implies that ‘there is a continuum from the behaviour of 
primitive organisms, governed entirely by genetically coded programs, to the 
sophisticated, deliberated actions of “rational man” governed by conjectures or mental 
models that are stored in memory’. According to Vanberg (op. cit., p. 27), ‘even the 
most deliberate and conscious instances of problem-solving are no less “program-
based” than any subconscious or unconscious routine behaviour, in the sense that they, 
too, have nothing else to rely on than conjectures…´. Thus, Vanberg views rationality 
as a problem-solving capacity that is stored on a person’s catalogue of conjectures or 
programs that exhibits no more wisdom than that embedded in the knowledge acquired 
in the past. According to this view, rationality ‘cannot guarantee pre-adaptedness, it is 
instead a matter of the backward-looking adaptedness of behavioral programs that 
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allows for a tentative, forward-looking response to current problem-situations’ (op. cit., 
pp. 28-29). As we will see, this aspect of the notion of human rationality embedded in 
both PTKL and Mayr´s notion of problem-solving behaviour implies the ability to solve 
certain problems that agents have encountered in the past does not necessarily imply 
that they are endowed with the ability to solve new (and different) problems that they 
encounter as the surrounding environment changes.       
Let us address Popper´s distinction between subjective and objective knowledge. 
The former consists of certain inborn dispositions of organisms and of their acquired 
modifications to act, whereas the latter consists of the logical content of our theories 
and, as such, it includes the world of language, conjectures, arguments, and scientific 
theories.7 As for subjective knowledge, Popper´s diagnosis is that it is part of a complex 
but accurate apparatus of adjustment that, in the main, works like objective conjectural 
knowledge, namely, by the method of trial and error-elimination or ‘auto-correction’ 
(Popper, 1972, p. 77). As for objective knowledge he notes that only a tiny part of it can 
be given sufficient reasons for certain truth. Such tiny part is denoted as demonstrable 
knowledge and comprises the propositions of formal logic, and arithmetic. All else, 
including knowledge associated to the natural and the social sciences, is conjectural or 
hypothetical knowledge and, hence, there are no sufficient reasons for holding it to be 
true (op. cit., p. 75). Thus, from the point of view of objective knowledge, all theories 
are conjectural albeit this does not preclude the possibility that some of them are true. 
The method of science, according to Popper, is ‘the method of bold conjectures 
and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (op. cit., p. 81). Since all theories 
involve universal statements, we can `learn´ by proving that our knowledge is false. 
Specifically, learning takes place either when we reject one´s prior theory or when we 
are forced to adjust one´s theory in a way that recognizes that in its prior version it was 
false (Popper, 1972, p. 81). Thus, we can only ‘learn’ by refuting our prior knowledge 
claim. As noted in Boland (2003b, p. 242), an implication of PTKL is that the mere 
accumulation of information does not increase the odds that our theories happen to be 
true because, as Popper insists, all we can ‘learn’ from experience is that some of our 
theories are false. In this respect, Boland (2003b, p. 248) makes a useful distinction 
between the quantitative and qualitative views of knowledge. The former corresponds to 
                                                 
7 Popper´s notion of `subjective knowledge´ also bears a strong resemblance to the notion of ‘reasoning 
instincts’ used in evolutionary psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 330).  
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the so-called ‘bucket theory of knowledge’ whereas the latter corresponds to Popper´s 
theory of knowledge. He then proposes the metaphor that, in Popper´s Socratic theory 
of learning, ‘knowledge is more like health that one can improve than wealth that one 
can have more of’. Hence, according to Boland (op. cit.), learning consists of improving 
one´s knowledge rather than of increasing it.     
The distinction between objective and subjective knowledge also leads Popper to 
distinguish between three different worlds or ontological domains: (i) the world of 
physical objects or states (World 1), (ii) the world of states of consciousness, or of 
mental states (World 2) and, lastly, (iii) the autonomous Platonic-like world of objective 
contents of thought, especially of scientific thoughts and works of art (World 3).8 His 
main thesis on this respect is that almost all our subjective knowledge (belonging to 
World 2) depends upon World 3, that is, on linguistically formulated theories (Popper, 
1972, p. 74). However, he argues that our mind may be connected to objects of both 
World 1 and 3 and this allows World 2 to act as a mediator between them. Further, he 
notes that World 3 exerts a profound influence upon World 1 through the actions of 
technologists who implement changes in World 1 by applying the predictions of these 
theories. Finally, he argues that we always select our P-S against a World 3 background 
which consists of, at least, a language and that ‘the activity of understanding consists 
essentially in operating with third-world objects’ (op. cit., p. 164). In particular, the 
development of science and art presupposes the prior existence of the human language 
which leads Popper (1990) to argue that the latter is, by far, the most important product 
of the human mind: 
 
‘Language makes it possible to consider our theories critically: to look at them 
as if they were external objects, as if they belonged to the world outside of ourselves 
which we share with others. Theories become objects of criticism, like the beaver dam’ 
(Popper, 1990, p. 51).    
 
Next, Popper sees science as one of the greatest creations of the human mind, 
comparable only to the emergence of a descriptive and argumentative language, since 
                                                 
8 According to Gattei (2009, p. 58), Popper´s World 3 bears a strong similarity to Plato´s theory of Ideas, 
and to Hegel´s theory of the Objective Spirit although he thinks it is `closer to Bolzano´s theory of a 
universe of statements in themselves and truth in themselves, or to Frege´s universe of objective contents 
of thought´.  
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its creation allowed men to replace: (i) the elimination of error in the violent struggle for 
life by non-violent rational criticism, and (ii) killing (World 1) and intimidation (World 
2) by the impersonal arguments of World 3 (op. cit., p. 84). He defines epistemology as 
the theory of the growth of scientific knowledge, that is, the theory of problem-solving, 
or of the critical discussion, evaluation, and critical testing of competing theories (op. 
cit., p. 142). However, as we mentioned above, PTKL is not only applicable to scientific 
knowledge but to any type of knowledge. As such, he sees scientists acting on the basis 
of hunches and guesses concerning what looks promising for future growth in the third 
world of objective knowledge. In so doing, he identifies content and virtual explanatory 
power as the most important criteria for the a priori appraisal of theories where both are 
related to their degree of testability. In turn, the most important criterion for their a 
posteriori appraisal is ‘verisimilitude’ or ‘nearness to truth’ and this, he argues, depends 
upon the way a theory has stood up to severe tests (op. cit., p. 143).9 The evaluation 
process is always critical and aims at error-elimination. Lastly, the exposure of scientific 
hypotheses to severe tests and criticism from the scientific community guarantees their 
increasing accuracy at explaining phenomena:   
 
`What is characteristic of science is that the selective system which weeds out 
among the variety of conjectures involves deliberate contact with the environment 
through experiment and quantified prediction, designed so that outcomes quite 
independent of the preferences of the investigator are possible. It is pre-eminently this 
feature that gives science its greater objectivity and its claim to a cumulative increase in 
the accuracy with which it describes the world´ (Campbell, 1974, p. 434).   
 
Finally, the growth of World 3 is not a repetitive or cumulative process alike 
Lamarckian instruction but a Darwinian selection process which consists of systematic 
error-elimination (op. cit., p. 149; also Popper, 1994, ch.1). He identifies three different 
levels of adaptation: genetic, behavioural learning, and scientific discovery. Scientific 
discovery is, according to him, a special case of adaptive behavioural learning. Popper 
asserts that, on all levels, the mechanism of adaptation to the surrounding environment 
is essentially the same, i.e., a Darwinian selection process by trial and error-elimination. 
In short, he views science ‘as a means used by the human species to adapt itself to the 
                                                 
9 As he aptly notes, a tautology, though obviously true, has zero truth content and zero verisimilitude.    
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surrounding environment: to invade new environmental niches, and even to invent new 
environmental niches’ (Popper, 1994, p. 2).   
 
3. Popper’s methodological prescription for the social sciences  
We now address Popper´s methodological prescription for the social sciences 
known as SA and the status of RP. Early presentations of the method of SA can be found 
in Popper´s Open Society (Popper, [1943a]1966, ch. 14, especially p. 97), in his Poverty 
of Historicism, originally published in three articles in Economica and, then, as a book 
(Popper, 1944-45, sections 31 & 32), in a French paper (Popper, 1967), and in Objective 
Knowledge (Popper, 1972, p. 179). However, the place where he presents it thoroughly 
is in the article titled “Models, Instruments, and Truth: The Status of the Rationality 
Principle in the Social Sciences” (Popper, 1994, ch. 8). This book chapter was originally 
written in response to an invitation that Popper received in the early 1960s from the 
Department of Economics at Harvard University and the lecture he delivered there on 
26 February 1963. As noted in de Bruin (2006, footnote 1), in 1963 and 1964 two new 
sections were added and a small extract was then circulated in the London School of 
Economics in 1967 and 1968. This extract was translated into French and published as 
`La rationalitè et le statut du principe de rationalitè´ (Popper, 1967) and, then, a Spanish 
translation of the French translation appeared about a year later. A revised version of the 
English extract was published in 1983 on pages 357-365 of an anthology titled A Pocket 
Popper which is currently available in Popper Selections (Popper, 1985). However, the 
full text of the speech at Harvard University was not made available until 1994 when it 
was published in a collection of Popper´s essays titled The Myth of the Framework.    
 
3.1. The Rationality Principle 
Popper´s thesis in that chapter is that there is no fundamental difference between 
the natural sciences and the social sciences since both of them resort to the construction 
of models or typical P-S to explain and predict events. If anything, models are viewed 
by him as being even more important in the social sciences due to the non-existence of 
universal laws. In any case, he argues that the models of the theoretical social sciences 
are always an over-simplification of reality and, hence, do not represent the facts truly. 
According to him, the fundamental problem of the social sciences is ‘to explain and 
understand events in terms of human actions and social situations’ (Popper, 1994, p. 
166). In turn, the reconstruction of social situations should include the consideration of 
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the relevant ‘social institutions’ which he defines as ‘all those things which set limits or 
create obstacles to our movements and actions’ (op. cit., p. 167). In his autobiography, 
Popper makes it clear that his methodological proposal for the social sciences stems 
from an ‘attempt to generalize the method of economic theory (marginal utility theory) 
so as to become applicable to the other theoretical social sciences’ (Popper 1976a, pp. 
117-118).  
Next, Popper makes a distinction between ‘rationality’ as a personal attitude and 
his RP. In particular, he makes it clear that his RP has nothing to do with the assumption 
that men adopt a rational attitude. Rather, he defines it as an a priori methodological 
principle which assumes that our actions are adequate to our problem-situations as we 
see them (Popper, 1994, p. 181). More specifically, he remarks that RP is not true: ‘The 
rationality principle is false. I think there is no way out of this. Consequently, I must 
deny that it is a priori valid’ (Popper, 1985, p. 361).10 Notwithstanding it, he believes it 
represents a good approximation to the truth. Thus, RP ‘does not play the role of an 
empirical explanatory theory, of a testable hypothesis’ (op. cit., p. 360). Rather, he 
views it as an integral part of every testable theory and proposes to avoid blaming it 
whenever our theory breaks down in the wake of empirical tests. His methodological 
advice to social scientists is thus never to abandon RP so that, in the wake of a 
refutation of their model, they should always revise their models of the agent’s P-S.11 
As Koertge (1975) shows, Popper’s views on the RP have evolved over time. As 
time passed by, he tended to weaken his claims about the kinds of actions that agents 
could be expected to perform so that ’where he had earlier spoken of actions as being 
`rational´ or `appropriate´, he now characterized them as `adequate´, or `adapted´, or `in 
accordance with the situation´ (op. cit. p. 441). According to him, the most likely reason 
for this evolution in terminology was his increasing emphasis on the fact that the P-S 
which played a central role in the explanation was not so much the agent’s objective P-S 
but, rather, the agent’s theory of her P-S or the P-S as the agent saw it (Koertge, 1975, 
                                                 
10 Of course, this applies to any premise aimed at providing a ‘closure’ for a model. As Loasby (1999, p. 
14) reminds us, ‘all closures are in some degree false. There can be no self-sufficient Cartesian scheme 
for deducing justified true knowledge from some original certainty’.  
 
11 This touches upon the issue of the incompatibility of Popper´s RP and his falsificationist methodology. 
For instance, Caldwell (1991, p. 13) argues that ‘Popper´s rationality principle represents an immunizing 
stratagem that is elevated to the status of an inviolable methodological principle’. In an attempt to 
reconcile both principles, Koertge (1979, p. 93) interprets RP as the Lakatosian hard-core of Popper´s 
research program in the social sciences whereas the positive heuristic is ‘his metaphysical theory of man 
as an evolving rational problem-solving animal’.  
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p. 442). She explains that RP really consists of two clauses: the first (RP-1) says that 
‘every action (by a person) is a rational response to some problem-situation’ whereas 
the second (RP-2) tells us that ‘every person in a problem-situation responds rationally 
to it’ (op. cit., p. 443). In turn, RP-1 entails: (i) that the response was issued through a 
methodical appraisal of the set of possible solutions available to the actor, (ii) that a 
description of both P-S and the appraisal process could be verbalized by the actor, and 
(iii) that the person acted as she did as a result of the appraisal process so that if a better 
alternative had been available to her she would have taken it. Thus, the complete RP 
formulated in Koertge (1975) emphasizes the close connection between the action and 
the systematic deliberation process from initial conditions that made the agent behave 
as she did. Further, Koertge (1979, p. 90) points out that requirement (i) above implies 
that ‘some systematic non-random decision procedure be used’ albeit she notices that 
Popper did not specify the minimal requirements which acceptable decision rules should 
satisfy. This means that RP can, in principle, be supplemented with different theories of 
belief formation. As Koertge (op. cit., p. 92) explains, for Popper, to explain an action 
using RP does not ‘imply that the agent’s beliefs are reasonable nor even that her way of 
making decisions is the best possible one’ but only presupposes that agents assess the 
situation in a systematic way.  
Next, as we noted above, Popper´s methodological advice to social scientists is 
never to abandon RP so that, in the wake of a refutation of their model, they should 
always revise instead their model of the agent’s P-S. He offers two arguments in favour 
of this strategy: (i) that we learn more if we blame our situational model, and (ii) that 
the adoption of RP ‘reduces considerably the arbitrariness of our models’ (op. cit., p. 
362). As for the first argument, he explains that: 
 
‘The main argument in favour of this policy is that our model is far more 
interesting and informative, and far better testable, than the principle of the adequacy of 
our actions. We do not learn much in learning that this is not strictly true: we know this 
already’ (Popper, 1985, p. 362). 
 
Likewise, Caldwell (1991, p. 25) argues that, although immunizing stratagems 
should be generally avoided ‘at least in the special case of situational analyses, one is 
able to criticize more severely and obtain fruitful criticisms if one blames the model 
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rather than RP whenever a falsification occurs’. As for the second argument, Popper 
explains that:  
 
‘The attempt to replace the rationality principle by another one seems to lead to 
complete arbitrariness in our model-building. And we must not forget that we can test a 
theory only as a whole, and that the test consists in finding the better of two competing 
theories which may have much in common; and most of them have the rationality 
principle in common’ (Popper, 1985, p. 362).  
 
As Hands (1985, p. 87) remarks, Popper’s first argument above means that if we 
are consistent with RP ‘the falsification of a specific theory only means that we have 
misspecified the “situation”, i.e., that we have attributed the wrong preferences or 
constraints to the individual’. In turn, Popper’s second argument implies that although 
RP is potentially falsifiable we choose to make a methodological decision that, when 
faced with a falsifying observation, we will stick to it and revise instead our hypotheses 
about the desires, beliefs, and constraints faced by agents (Hands, 1985, p. 88). Notably, 
Becker (1976) resorts to a similar argument to justify the use of rational choice theory. 
According to him, human behaviour can be viewed from the standpoint of individuals 
who seek to maximize their utility from a stable set of preference and subject to a given 
constraint. Where action appears to deviate from the predictions of neoclassical utility 
theory, Becker claims that little is gained from resorting to explanations in terms of 
irrationality, changes in preferences or cultural values, etc… for such explanations are 
ad hoc and may even be contradictory. Furthermore, he adds that the question is left 
unanswered of just why human behaviour should be sometimes rational but sometimes 
not.     
According to Caldwell (1991, p. 15), there are two main weaknesses in Popper´s 
presentation of SA: (i) vagueness about how it should be implemented, and (ii) Popper´s 
apparent belief that SA is the only adequate method to adopt in the theoretical social 
sciences. As for the first point, we have presented above a clearer explanation of how to 
apply it suggested in Koertge (1979). As for the second point, Caldwell (1991, p. 16) 
readily admits that SA is a powerful and fruitful method for the social sciences, yet he 
criticizes Popper´s idea that SA is the only legitimate method for the theoretical social 
sciences. Further, he recognizes that there is a tension between falsificationism and SA 
owing to the fact that RP adopts the status of a methodological prescription that plays 
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the role of an immunizing stratagem.12 A discussion of this issue is in Hands (1985, p. 
89) who argues that, by Popperian standards, scientific explanations based on RP ‘are as 
close to metaphysical explanations as they are to scientific explanations’ and, hence, the 
tension between these two methodological principles can hardly be resolved.  Caldwell 
(1985) proposes to solve the conflict between SA and falsificationism by adopting a 
broader conception of acceptable scientific practice based on ‘critical rationalism’ 
whose goal is to subject theories to an optimal amount of criticism. In turn, the latter 
will depend on both the specific problem to be solved and the nature of the problem 
under investigation (op. cit., p. 25). Such prescription was proposed in Klappholz & 
Agassi (1959) and, later on, it has been promoted by Boland (2003a) who stresses that 
the only generally applicable methodological rule is the exhortation to be always critical 
and ready to subject one’s hypotheses to critical scrutiny. More specifically, he insists 
we should focus on the Socratic-Popper identified in Klappholz & Agassi (1959) and 
thus discard the Lakatos-Popper (also known as Popper the ‘falsificationist’) promoted 
by Latsis (1972) and Blaug (1975). According to him, if we put falsificationism aside in 
favour of ‘critical rationalism’ the conflict between SA and falsificationism vanishes.  
  
3.2. The two versions of the Rationality Principle 
Latsis (1983) was probably the first commentator to identify the existence of an 
`objectivist´ version (RPo) and a `subjectivist´ version (RPs) of RP in Popper´s work.13 
In the former, the relevant P-S is that one as seen by the theoretician whereas, in the 
latter, the theoretician is supposed to reconstruct P-S as seen by agents. Latsis (op. cit.) 
denotes the former as the `strong´ version of RP. According to Latsis (op. cit., p. 131), 
Popper both weakens and widens the notion of rationality in human behaviour when 
adopting RPs.14 Building on the distinction between RPo and RPs, Nadeau (1993, p. 
463) notes that `an attentive reading of the 1967 text shows that although Popper views 
the RP as an explanatory principle throughout the text, he surreptitiously changes his 
                                                 
12 Notwithstanding the intellectual authority of Popper, economists like Hayek (1967, p. 29) or Hutchison 
(1977, p. 43) question the applicability of Popper’s falsificationanist methodology to economics. Indeed, 
the applicability of strict falsificationism to the social sciences appears to be problematic even to Popper 
himself as noted in Hands (1985, p. 96). 
    
13 However, we will argue below that a clear antecedent of this distinction is in Hayek (1937).  
 
14 By contrast, we will argue below that the `subjectivist´ version of RP is a legitimate and potentially 
fruitful one in the social sciences.  
 
 18
way of formulating it during the course of his argument, going from an objectivist 
formulation at the beginning of the text to a subjectivist formulation at the end´. Hands 
(1991, footnote 14) recognizes that `Popper is really unclear on this´, and Latsis (1983, 
p. 133) claims that Popper seems either `confused or deliberately elusive´ on this issue. 
Be that as it may, Hands (op. cit.) points out that in his 1985 text Popper adopts the 
subjectivist interpretation when he openly says that rationality is only `as agents see it´ 
and SA can thus be applied to apparently irrational behaviour such as the behaviour of a 
`madman´ (Popper, 1985, p. 363).15 However, he adds that Popper also denotes SA `a 
purely objective method´ which `can be developed independently of all subjective and 
psychological ideas (Popper, 1976, p. 172) and that, elsewhere, Popper says that RP is 
the `general law that sane persons as a rule act more or less rationally´ (Popper, 1966, p. 
265).  
Now, in a passage of his 1967 French paper, Popper (1985, p. 363) proposes his 
famous example of the `flustered driver´ who, by trying to park stubbornly his car in 
evidently too small a space, does not act in a way that is appropriate to the situation in 
which he finds himself and then recognizes that `we employ the rationality principle to 
the limit of what is possible whenever we try to understand the action of a madman´ 
(Popper, 1994, p. 179). It is in the section of the chapter where he notices that cases of 
neurosis have been explained by Freud and other psychologists with the help of their 
own version of the RP that he switches to a subjectivist version of RP. Then, in a key 
note to one of the paragraphs (footnote 19), he acknowledges that he refers successively 
to two versions of his RP and even identifies a third intermediate version according to 
which P-S is said to be `as the agent could (within the objective situation) have seen it´ 
(Popper, 1994, ch. 8, footnote 19).16 In the aftermath of it, Lagueux (2006, p. 201) 
concludes that, according to Popper, `what the agent sees may or may not be considered 
a part of the objective situation that the model describes´. Summing up, the `objectivist´ 
version (RPo) supposes that agents possess `true´ knowledge; the `subjectivist´ version 
                                                 
15 Yet, Zouboulakis (2014, p. 87) argues that it is clear that Popper has an `objectivist´ version of RP in 
mind. 
 
16 Prior to this clarification, Popper (1972) had already recognized the existence of two versions of SA: 
 
         `There are many cases in which we can reconstruct, objectively (even though conjecturally), (a) the 
situation as it was and (b) a very different situation as it appeared to the agent, or as it was understood, 
or interpreted by the agent. It is interesting that this can be dome even in the history of science´ (Popper, 
1972, p. 179, footnote 27).  
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(RPs) supposes that the alleged knowledge that agents possess is partially wrong; and 
the third version constitutes an intermediate case. However, in all three versions of RP it 
is assumed that the agent acts in a way that is appropriate to the state of his knowledge 
(Popper, 1994, ch. 8, footnote 19; Lagueux, 2006, p. 201).  
Next, building on the terminology coined in Latsis (1972), Kerstenetzky (2009, 
p. 201) denotes RPo the `maximal´ or `single-exit´ interpretation and RPs the `minimal´ 
or `multiple-exit´ interpretation of RP. The `single-exit´ interpretation stems from the 
fact that, if it is supposed that the agent perceives P-S in an objective way, there is thus 
only `one´ possible solution whereas the `multiple-exit´ interpretation captures the idea 
that, in principle, there are as many solutions as subjective perceptions of P-S exist. It is 
the `multiple-exit´ interpretation that is of interest in the context of the `subjectivist´ SA. 
In particular, the issue is whether we can assume for methodological purposes that the 
different subjective perceptions of P-S held by actors actually converge on a `single´ 
one and, if so, how this convergence comes about. Alike Jacobs (1990), Kerstenetzky 
(op. cit) associates the `objectivist´ or `single-exit´ modelling to the influence on Popper 
of the work of Weber. By contrast, Hedström et al. (1998, p. 359) do not think there is 
textual evidence that Popper got the inspiration for the notion of SA from Weber´s work 
and suggest that if there was any influence at all it was probably indirect since Hayek 
— a friend of Popper — admired Weber. However, it could be argued that Popper´s 
method for the theoretical social sciences takes on board Weber´s notion of `interpretive 
understanding´ or `verstehen´ — developed later on by the Austrian economists — and, 
especially, his notions of `ideal type´ and of `instrumental rationality´, i.e., the use of 
rationality to bring about change in the surrounding world in the interest of the actor 
(Weber, 1949).17 Be that as it may, there is some textual evidence that points to Hayek 
as the most important direct source of influence on Popper´s work. Notably, Popper 
(1994, ch. 8, note 1) writes that `I was particularly impressed by Hayek´s formulation 
that economics is the “logic of choice”´ as expressed in his essay titled `Economics and 
                                                 
17 However, it has been argued that, although the notion of `single-exit´ modelling and SA originates with 
Weber, for him this and related concepts were tools of historical analysis, not of theory (Langlois, 1995, 
p. 230; 1998, p. 69). Interestingly, a philosophical foundation for Weber´s notion of `ideal type´ is in the 
school of phenomenology and, particularly, in Schutz´s concept of `second-order typifications´ (Schutz, 
1972). 
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Knowledge´ (Hayek, 1937, pp. 33ff). According to Popper, it was this that led him to 
the formulation of the `logic of the situation´ in his Poverty of Historicism.18  
Finally, there is the issue of the status of RP. We have already mentioned above 
the profound ambiguity of Popper´s explanation about the status of RP. The subsequent 
discussion about the role and status of RP among Popper´s commentators focused on 
the distinction between RPo and RPs. For instance, Lagueux (1993, 2006) argues that, 
even if we adopt the `subjectivist´ interpretation, RP cannot be a priori true because, 
according to him, it is simply not true that people always act appropriately according to 
the P-S as they see it. Notwithstanding it, he thinks that RP occupies an exceptional 
place in the social sciences because it constitutes a condition of intelligibility of any 
phenomenon that derives from human action. More specifically, the latter can only be 
intelligible, i.e., understood by an external observer, when it is motivated by reasons, 
that is, when it represents an appropriate response to P-S as seen by the agent (Lagueux, 
2006, p. 205). He concludes that maintaining RP after acknowledging that it is not a 
priori true is, after all, to claim that `in spite of the fact that irrational decisions occur, 
human actions are nonetheless normally understandable´ (op. cit.).  
 
4. The notion of rationality in Popper´s philosophy of the social sciences 
In section 2 we showed that PTKL implies that: (i) all knowledge is conjectural, 
(ii) that we learn through an (endless) process whereby we subject our conjectures to 
trial and discard those ones that turn out to be wrong, and (iii) that the learning process 
is imperfect and never converges to an optimum. Consequently, the most important 
feature of knowledge is its fallibility. By contrast, Popper´s methodological proposal for 
the social sciences has been denoted as ‘situational determinism’ (Latsis, 1972; Oakley, 
2002) which suggests that there may be some key epistemological differences between 
PTKL and SA. The first thing we should like to note is that PTKL is a theory about the 
nature of knowledge and its growth over time while SA is a methodological prescription 
                                                 
18 The interrelation between the ideas of Hayek and Popper is discussed in Oakley (1999) and Caldwell 
(2003). For instance, Popper (1943) appears to have been inspired by Hayek (1942) when expressing his 
crucial idea that both our institutions and traditions are largely the `indirect, the unintended and often the 
unwanted by-products´ of conscious and intentional human actions and, therefore, that `only a minority of 
social institutions are consciously designed, while the vast majority have just “grown”, as the undesigned 
results of human actions´ (Popper, [1943a] 1966, p. 93). Likewise, Hayek had already argued that social 
studies deal `not with the relations between things, but with the relations between men and things or the 
relations between man and man. They are concerned with man´s actions and their aim is to explain the 
unintended or undesigned results of the actions of many men´ (Hayek, 1942, p. 276).     
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aimed, arguably, at speeding up the rate of progress of the social sciences so that these 
two elements of Popper´s philosophy do correspond to the positive and methodological 
domain respectively. That said, we believe there is also a normative element in PTKL 
since trial and error-elimination can also be said to be the way we should behave when 
seeking to expand our knowledge. In any case, error-elimination can only proceed after 
there is clear-cut evidence that, retrospectively, a decision made in the past was wrong. 
However, this does not provide us with a systematic rule for making decisions in the 
future other than to avoid repeating the same mistakes made in the past. In short, error-
elimination is an incomplete guide to decision-making.  
Next, we may wonder how SA would look like if the agents that are the object of 
the modelling exercise exhibited a theory of knowledge and learning akin to PTKL. To 
be sure, the situational model of the typical P-S consists of three elements: (i) external 
(and observable) elements such as the physical and social constraints agents are subject 
to, (ii) the knowledge and information that agents possess, and (iii) their goals and aims. 
Now, if agents behave according to PTKL, then the situational model of the typical P-S 
should incorporate the knowledge they possess which would include the experience 
accumulated from mistakes they made in the past given the specific circumstances that 
prevailed at that time. Therefore, adequate behaviour would imply, as a minimum, not 
repeating previous mistakes. However, as we noted above, there is no further guidance 
for agents stemming from PTKL as far as future decision-making is concerned in case 
they encounter new (and different) P-S. In short, PTKL appears to be compatible with 
SA provided the situational model includes agents´ learning from previous mistakes. 
 
4.1. PTKL versus SA: the `rationality of agents´ 
We noted above that several commentators, as well as Popper (1994, ch. 8, note 
19) himself, identify two different versions of RP: an `objectivist´ version (RPo) and a 
`subjectivist´ version (RPs). According to the former, the relevant P-S is the `objective´ 
P-S, that is, the P-S as it actually is whereas, according to the latter, the theoretician 
should reconstruct P-S as it is actually seen by the agents. As Popper (1972, p. 179) 
recognizes, in both cases P-S is conjectured.19 That said, we will argue below that, if 
Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the `facts of the social sciences´ are taken on board, there 
                                                 
19 In this respect, let us mention that Menger ([1871] 1950, p. 148) was one of the first social scientists to 
incorporate error within his model and to argue that all knowledge (both of the actors and of the theorist) 
is bound to be prone to errors. 
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is no reason a priori to expect that the theoretician´s view of P-S is closer to the `true´ 
P-S than agents´ (Hayek, 1943). This is because, as Hayek argues, the theoretician does 
not possess superior relevant knowledge that is not shared by agents. Be that as it may, 
RPo and RPs constitute two different modelling strategies in the social sciences the 
consequences of which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been explored so far. 
Notably, an antecedent is Schumpeter´s distinction between `objective rationality´ and 
`subjective rationality´ (Schumpeter, 1984). He defines the former as consisting of the 
`applicability of a rational schema to the actor´s behaviour´ and he defines the latter as 
the `conformity of the actors´ mental processes to a rational schema´ (op. cit., p. 583). 
Crucially, he states that the former need not imply the latter and criticizes the tendency 
of some social scientists to implicitly identify the rationality of the `observer´ with the 
subjective rationality of the `observed´ (op. cit., p. 583). He uses the example of the 
neoclassical theory of monopoly to illustrate the notion of `objective rationality´:  
 
`The model just described is the product of the analyst´s mind as much as any 
physical theory is, and does not in itself say anything about reality or about anybody´s 
actual behavior or rationality… Even if the model should fit anyone´s behaviour this 
does not mean that the individual in question consciously aims at the result and still less 
that he arrives at it by processes at all similar to the analytic procedure´ (Schumpeter, 
op. cit., p. 580).  
 
Schumpeter´s notion of `objective rationality´ is closely associated to his notion 
of `rationality of the observer´ whereas the notion of `subjective rationality´ is coupled 
to his notion of the `rationality in the observed´. In the example of monopoly theory, he 
explains that the construction of a model will give us the conditions under which the 
maximization of profits will be attained thereby setting up a standard against which the 
theorist can compare actual behaviour. However, he makes it clear that such model is 
entirely a product of the `rationality of the observer´ and, hence, the usefulness of the 
modelling exercise will depend on the degree to which that hypothesis is justified by 
facts (op. cit., p. 580). According to him, a common source of divergence between the 
type of human behaviour that stems from the `rationality of the observer´ and the 
`rationality in the observed´ is the existence of a multiplicity of ends in actors´ minds. 
To the extent that the goals of actors are also an element of P-S, the adoption of a 
subjectivist interpretation of RP will require that the theoretician understands the goals 
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of actors without this necessarily implying that she shares them. Now, the relevance of 
his notion of `subjective rationality´ emerges clearly in those cases where the situational 
model constructed on the basis of the `rationality of the observer´ does not fit the facts. 
As Schumpeter notes, in such cases the task of the theoretician is to explain the reasons 
for the discrepancy between the `rationality of the observer´ and the `rationality in the 
observed´ (op. cit., p. 586). In turn, this will require an effort by the former to adopt the 
point of view of the `observed´:  
 
`Understanding an end and judging rationality of means often requires that the 
analyst “puts himself” into places very far distant from his time and social location. 
Sometimes he has to transplant himself into another cultural world´ (Schumpeter, 1984, 
p. 583).  
 
These ideas on the methodology of the social sciences were originally written by 
Schumpeter circa 1940 for a Harvard discussion group on rationality which included 
Parsons, Leontief, and Sweezy. The manuscript remained unpublished for more than 40 
years until Professor Loring Allen of the University of Missouri in St. Louis found it 
among the papers of Schumpeter in the Harvard University archives. It was published 
posthumously in 1984 at the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. We 
believe this manuscript contains some intuitions that exhibit a high degree of affinity 
with Popper´s notions of RPo and RPs (Popper, 1994). However, we should like to note 
that it was Hayek´s Economica essay `Economics & Knowledge´ (Hayek, 1937) where 
the distinction between `objective´ and `subjective´ rationality was first formulated. In 
that essay, Hayek criticises equilibrium economic theory for making an illegitimate use 
of the concept of `data´ possessed by economic agents as well as for the methodological 
confusion thus created:    
 
`But this does not solve the question whether the facts referred to are supposed 
to be given to the observing economist, or to the persons whose actions he wants to 
explain, and if to the latter, whether it is assumed that the same facts are known to all 
the different persons in the system, or whether the “data” for the different persons may 
be different… There seems to be no possible doubt that these two concepts of “data”, on 
the one hand in the sense of the objective real facts, as the observing economist is 
supposed to know them, and on the other hand in the subjective sense, as things known 
 24
to the persons whose behaviour we try to explain are really fundamentally different and 
ought to be kept carefully apart. And, as we shall see, the question why the data in the 
subjective sense of the term should ever come to correspond to the objective data is one 
of the main problems we have to answer´ (Hayek, 1937, p. 39, emphasis added).  
 
We know that Popper had read Hayek´s 1937 paper in Economica and, indeed, 
he refers to it as the key source of his understanding of the core of economics (Popper, 
1994, p. 181, footnote 1). According to Popper, it was Hayek´s exposition of the `logic 
of choice´ in that paper that led him to the formulation of the `logic of the situation´ as 
embracing both the `logic of choice´ and the `logic of historical P-S´. Yet, Popper does 
not refer explicitly to Hayek´s distinction between subjective and objective data. That 
said, it is very likely that Popper´s recognition, later on, of a distinction between RPo 
and RPs is related to his acquaintance with Hayek´s Economica essay. In the following 
sections we will explore in some detail the relation between these two concepts as well 
as their relation to PTKL from the point of view of the agents that are the object of the 
modelling exercise performed by the theoretician.  
 
4.1.1. PTKL versus the `subjectivist´ version of SA 
Let us focus on the relation between RPs and PTKL. To be sure, RPs constitutes 
a minimal requirement for rationality in that agents´ behaviour only has to be adequate 
or appropriate to the P-S as they see it. This implies that, as in the Austrian School of 
von Mises, Hayek, and Schumpeter, rationality is associated to behaviour that is goal-
directed or purposive.20 This type of rationality is sometimes denoted as instrumental in 
the sense that reason becomes an instrument to reach a certain goal, e.g. an increase in 
pleasure.21 Although there are significant methodological differences among members 
of the Austrian School of economics, they all viewed economics as part of a science of 
                                                 
20 As von Mises explains:  
 
`Every human action aims at the substitution of more satisfactory conditions for less satisfactory. Man 
acts because he feels uneasy and believes that he has the power to relieve to some extent his uneasinesss 
by influencing the course of events. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would not have 
any incentive to change things; he would have neither wishes nor desires, he would not act because he 
would be perfectly happy... Strictly speaking, only the increase in satisfaction (decrease of uneasiness) 
should be called end, and accordingly all states which bring about such an increase means´ (von Mises, 
1944, p. 532).   
 
21 The notion of `instrumental rationality´ goes back as far as Max Weber´s sociological histories of world 
religions culminating with his classic study of modern European Christianity (Weber, 1904-5).  
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human action whose core is `to be found in the unique property possessed by human 
beings of engaging in operations designed to attain a state of affairs that is preferred to 
that which has hitherto prevailed´ (Kirzner, 1976, p. 148). What is crucial in our context 
is that the Austrian School´s conception of rationality is subjective in the sense of being 
an a priori assumption about human behaviour. There are two sources of subjectivity. 
First, there is the subjectivity of actors´ ends or, as von Mises puts it: 
 
`Nobody else than the individual himself can decide what satisfies him better 
and what less... There is no such thing as an absolute state of satisfaction or happiness 
irrespective of the desires of the individual concerned´ (von Mises, 1944, p. 533).  
 
Second, there is the subjectivity of knowledge itself in the social sciences. As 
long argued in Hayek (1943), it is only in the social sciences that our interpretation of a 
situation no matter whether it is right or wrong becomes an integral part of the situation 
thus affecting subsequent developments. Further, and to the extent that we understand 
the surrounding world via the ‘internal models’ we create, our understanding of the 
world will affect our decisions and, in this way, it may affect the world itself. Hayek 
(op. cit.) illustrates this theme by explaining the purposive nature of human action. As 
he explains, just as we cannot speak of the objective properties of a tool without saying 
something about the purpose for which the tool is used so we cannot speak of social 
institutions objectively. Laws and economic institutions cannot be known apart from the 
intentions of the individuals who use them. In the field of economics, for instance, the 
value of money depends on the opinions of individuals who use it rather than on any 
inherent property of it. As we argue below, Hayek´s ideas on the methodology of the 
social sciences seem to have been ignored by most commentators of Popper´s work in 
that field. 
Members of the Austrian School of economics like von Mises or Hayek adopted 
the `praxeological approach´ which consists of a theory of human action based on a set 
of self-evidently true a priori axioms on behaviour which, in turn, yields conclusions 
which are true regardless of time and place. However, the axioms of praxeology are not 
arbitrary like, for instance, those of mathematics. Rather, Austrian economists maintain 
that these axioms are already given to us in our minds and that, through the exercise of 
`introspection´ or `verstehen´, which consists of understanding the functioning of our 
minds, we have the possibility of understanding the behaviour of others. That said, the 
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extreme subjectivism of the Austrian School of Economics leads to the conclusion that 
there is no possibility of acquiring knowledge about any social phenomena other than 
through `introspection´. Further, the notion of rationality proposed by von Mises (1944) 
as purposive behaviour may preclude the generation of predictions which can be subject 
to empirical tests. This is because the hypotheses about social phenomena derived from 
self-evident axioms may be close to being true but they may also possess little empirical 
content. This problem is addressed in Popper (1963, pp. 217-19) who makes it clear that 
science characterises as preferable `the theory which tells us more; that is to say, the 
theory which contains the greater amount of empirical information or content´. In other 
words, the empirical content of a theory increases with the increasing improbability of it 
being true or else with its increasing exposure to falsification. He uses the example of 
meteorological forecasts; a forecast according to which in some unspecified time in the 
future it will rain has, as he explains, a high probability of being true yet it has virtually 
no empirical content, whereas a forecast which specifies the date and the time it is likely 
to rain has a high degree of empirical content yet it is quite likely to be false. Likewise, 
predictions derived from general or self-evident axioms on human behaviour like the 
ones of praxeology — which amount to stating little more than all human behaviour is 
purposeful — have a high probability of being true yet they have little empirical content 
because they are not falsifiable. By contrast, the subjectivist version of SA proposed by 
Popper (1985) is not subject to the previous criticism since, in addition to incorporating 
all the relevant elements of P-S — including the physical and social constrains and the 
knowledge and information possessed by agents — it also posits that actors´ behaviour 
is `adequate´ to P-S as they see it. The requirement that actors´ behaviour is `adequate´ 
— in addition to being purposeful or goal-oriented — implies, in turn, that the empirical 
content of theories constructed upon RPs exceeds the empirical content of theories about 
human behaviour derived from praxeology.    
Let us distinguish between ‘means-rationality’, ‘beliefs-rationality’, and ‘ends-
rationality’ (Hamlin, 1986). ‘Means-rationality’ implies the correctness of one´s actions 
given one´s desires and beliefs regardless of whether the latter are right. Therefore, as a 
minimum ‘means-rationality’ implies consistency of choice by agents. For instance, in 
neoclassical microeconomics, ‘means-rationality’ is characterized by consistency in the 
preferences of households or transitivity: if an agent prefers a to b and b to c, then a 
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must also be preferred to c. 22 The further requirements that are usually imposed, i.e., 
that individuals´ preferences exhibit both ‘completeness’ and ‘continuity’, are not ones 
of ‘means-rationality’ but rather of the optimization methods through which economists 
seek to represent individual preferences by a ‘utility function’. Thus, when economists 
speak of `rational´ agents what they usually have in mind is that their choices have to 
be, at least, consistent with one another.  
Next, following Hamlin (op. cit), ‘beliefs-rationality’ implies that an individual´s 
(subjective) model of the surrounding world represents a good enough approximation to 
reality. Similarly, Bicchieri (1992) defines ‘epistemic’ rationality as a characteristic of 
beliefs that consists in their being correct given the evidence that is available to agents. 
Finally, ‘ends-rationality’ means that the behaviour of agents is purposeful or oriented 
to the achievement of a goal and, hence, not the result of chance (Hamlin, op. cit.). For 
instance, in neoclassical economics ‘ends-rationality’ is associated to the pursuit of self-
interest. To be sure, this has been so since Edgeworth who, in his 1881 Mathematical 
Psychics, stated that ‘the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only 
by self-interest’. Prior to the emergence of ‘neoclassical’ economics in the second half 
of the 19th century, the classical statement of mainstream economics methodology is in 
Mill ([1836] 1967). Be that as it may, Twomey (1998, p. 435) claims that the clearest 
statements of this tradition were already present in the works of Bentham and Hobbes. 
In particular, he argues that Bentham (1789) first formulated the notion that agents are 
motivated to maximise pleasure whereas Hobbes (1651) provided a statement of egoism 
according to which individuals always seek their own greatest good. Therefore, we may 
characterise the `praxeologic´ models of the Austrian school of economics as implying 
`ends-rationality´ and the situational models based upon RPs as implying both ‘means-
rationality’ and ‘ends-rationality’ but not ‘beliefs-rationality’. As we will argue below, 
each of these types of models implies a different division line between `rational´ and 
`irrational´ behaviour.   
The absence of ‘beliefs-rationality’ in models based on RPs implies that agents´ 
beliefs may well be wrong ex-post, i.e., that agents are fallible. Specifically, agents may 
                                                 
22 For instance, in the neoclassical theory of the consumer, ‘means-rationality’ consists of the axioms of 
completeness, independence, reflexivity, and transitivity of preferences (Dow, 1995, p. 724). In the case 
of the expected utility model developed by von Neumman and Morgenstern (1947), which constitutes the 
modern theory of choice under risk, ‘means-rationality’ is satisfied if the following four assumptions or 
axioms are fulfilled: cancellation, transitivity, dominance, and invariance. To this, we may add the more 
technical assumptions of comparability and continuity.  
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perceive the physical and social constraints they face erroneously or may simply 
possess wrong information. Therefore, the adoption of RPs implies that agents´ beliefs 
are liable to error and, hence, understanding their behaviour (including their mistakes) 
will require the construction of a model of the typical P-S as seen by agents. It follows 
from this that the adoption of RPs is a priori compatible with PTKL since the agents in 
the typical model can make mistakes stemming from their wrong beliefs. Yet, the notion 
of adequate behaviour according to PTKL also implies, as noted above, the requirement 
that agents `learn´ from their past mistakes, i.e., they do not repeat them. Consequently, 
full compatibility of RPs with PTKL would require that the theoretician recognizes that 
agents do not repeat their mistakes in the future. As we will see below, this feature of 
PTKL may create a tension with RPs when the purpose of the modelling exercise is to 
make predictions.23 We may also add that, if RPs is adopted, the point of view of the 
theoretician vis-à-vis the actors becomes analogous to the position of participants in the 
`Beauty Contests´ that were so popular in the British tabloids in the 1930s and that were 
metaphorically captured by Keynes in his General Theory to explain the formation of 
prices in financial markets (Keynes, 1936, p. 156). To be sure, in `Beauty Contests´, 
what participants were supposed to do in order to win the prize was not so much to 
identify — among the photos of beautiful ladies portrayed in a panel — the lady they 
believed to be the most beautiful one but to `guess´ the photo of the lady they believed 
other participants would select as the most beautiful one. In a similar fashion, we will 
argue below that, if RPs is adopted, the theoretician seeks to reconstruct P-S not as she 
sees it herself but the way she thinks agents see it.  
Next, and crucially, to the extent a discrepancy exists between the theoretician´s 
(objective) view of P-S and his conjecture about agents´ view of P-S, the generation of  
predictions will require making the crucial assumption that such a discrepancy and the 
                                                 
23 As noted in Beinhocker (2013), in the context of the social sciences, a prediction (unlike a forecast) 
amounts barely to the deductive logical consequences of a theory. It should be noted, however, that the 
predictions to be derived from the models in the social sciences differ from the predictions generated by 
the theories of the natural sciences. In particular, Popper (1994, p. 163) distinguishes between explaining 
or predicting singular events from problems of explaining or predicting a kind or type of event. According 
to Popper, the former can be solved without constructing a model ― no more than certain universal laws 
and the relevant initial conditions are needed ― whereas the latter is most easily solved by means of 
constructing a model (op. cit., p. 164). Further, he argues (Popper, op. cit., p. 165), that a model consists 
of `certain elements placed in a typical relationship to each other, plus certain universal laws of 
interaction — the "animating" laws´. Unlike theories, models try to capture the typical aspects of P-S in 
order to make statements about a type of event and, hence, they represent something akin to typical initial 
conditions (op. cit., p. 164). In turn, a statement about a typical event can be either an explanation of why 
that typical event occurred in the past, or else, a prediction, that is, a logical consequence of the theory.  
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`situational factors´ that warrant it exhibit a high degree of stability over time. In turn, 
the former implies that the `null hypothesis´ in empirical tests applied on a situational 
model which adopts RPs is that agents´ view of P-S is, at least partially, wrong whereas 
the alternative hypothesis is that the theoretician´s (objective) view of P-S is correct. If 
such discrepancy were to disappear over time for some reason (e.g., learning by agents), 
the predictions derived from it would be equivalent to the predictions generated if RPo 
were adopted. Thus, we disagree with Vanberg (2002, p. 12) when he argues that the 
`subjectivist´ RP poses a testability problem vis-à-vis the `objectivist´ RP. Specifically, 
situational models that adopt RPs can generate predictions albeit, as we argued above, 
their generation implicitly implies adopting the assumption that agents´ view of P-S will 
remain constant in the future. Unless the theoretician does so, the models´ testability 
will be seriously weakened. This is because, in the wake of an unfavourable empirical 
test, the theoretician may try to circumvent its refutation by arguing that the adverse 
result of the empirical test was due, for instance, to an (unpredictable) change in agents´ 
view of P-S. Thus, a sine qua non condition for potential refutability in this case, i.e., 
for the model to possess `empirical content´, is that agents´ view of P-S is assumed to 
remain constant over time or, else, that agents follow a constant pattern of behaviour in 
spite of the mistakes such behaviour may bring about. However, this assumption creates 
some tension with PTKL since, according to the latter, agents tend to purge their wrong 
beliefs over time.    
Now, we have argued above that, if RPs is adopted, it is implicitly assumed that 
(i) there is a discrepancy between the theoretician´s view of P-S and agents´ view of P-
S, and (ii) that the former persists over time. As we argued above, this implies (under 
the null hypothesis) that the agents whose behaviour the theoretician seeks to capture in 
the situational model do not revise their wrong beliefs which runs counter to PTKL. The 
discrepancy alluded to above is between two different conjectures: (i) the theoretician´s 
(objective) view of P-S, and (ii) agents´ view of P-S. According to Popper (1994, p. 
178), the latter is always part of the former since the theoretician can only understand 
agents´ view of P-S if she reconstructs a wider view of P-S than their own. Specifically, 
if we adopt Popper´s interpretation of RPs, what the theoretician subjects to empirical 
test is the hypothesis that agents systematically fail to perceive the `true´ P-S and, under 
the null hypothesis, this implies that agents´ view of P-S will be disappointed if the 
theoretician´s view of P-S is correct. However, as we have argued above, the systematic 
disappointment of beliefs will come about because it is implicitly assumed that agents 
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do not `learn´ from their mistakes, i.e., they tend to repeat mistakes all over. However, 
the above-mentioned tension between PTKL and RPs does not arise if the main purpose 
of constructing a situational model is to explain the past (e.g., historical interpretation) 
rather than to generate predictions. This is because in the former case the theoretician 
need not be concerned about the persistence into the future of a discrepancy between 
agents´ view of P-S and her `objective´ view of P-S. In short, RPs is more problematic 
than Popper recognized if the purpose of constructing a situational model is to generate 
predictions. 24  
To finish off this section, a clear example of this tension between PTKL and RPs 
is the Keynesian-type business cycle theory proposed by Minsky (1975) which is based 
on overoptimistic expectations of economic agents about their ability to honour future 
cash commitments which result from their inherited liability structure. According to 
Minsky´s `financial instability hypothesis´ (op. cit.), market economies are intrinsically 
unstable owing to the fact that economic agents become systematically overoptimistic 
during the upswing which makes them take on an excessive amount of debt and this 
eventually triggers off an asset price deflation and a subsequent financial crisis that 
precipitates the economy into a downswing. In other words, Minsky´s theory posits that, 
as memories from the last financial crisis fade out, agents will tend to underestimate the 
risk implied by the increase in the level of real indebtedness so that the upswing ends up 
when an external factor, e.g., an increase in interest rates, leads to an initial decrease in 
the price of real and financial assets which then brings about a reassessment of liability 
structures and, finally, leads to an asset price deflation. In other words, Minsky´s theory 
is an example of business cycle theory where (i): there is a discrepancy between the 
theoretician´s `objective´ view of P-S and agents´ view of P-S, and (ii) it is (implicitly) 
                                                 
24  Notturno (1998, p. 412, emphasis added) argues that the `problem of situational analysis in the 
theoretical and historical social sciences, in Popper´s view, is not to construct models that predict or 
prophesize the future; it is to construct models that help us to explain and understand the past´. In this 
respect, Popper seems to view RPs as being particularly suited to the task of historical explanation:  
 
         `The historian´s task is, therefore, so to reconstruct the problem situation as it appeared to the agent, 
that the actions of the agent become adequate to the situation… Our conjectural reconstruction of the 
situation may be a real historical discovery. It may explain any aspect of history so far unexplained´ 
(Popper, 1972, p. 189). 
 
           Furthermore, Popper (op. cit., p. 166, emphasis in original) explains that `the fundamental problem 
of both the theoretical and the historical social sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of 
human actions and [typical] social situations´ and, hence, does not mention the generation of predictions 
as one of the aims of the social sciences. 
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assumed that agents tend to repeat their past mistakes so the same phenomenon (i.e., 
business cycles), occurs recurrently and inevitably.       
 
4.1.2. PTKL versus the `objectivist´ version of SA 
According to Hands (1992, p. 28), `it is easy to see that situational analysis is the 
method of microeconomics (and of any macroeconomics based on micro foundations)´. 
Indeed, Popper recognizes that his source of inspiration for SA is the methodology of 
neoclassical microeconomics (Popper, [1943a] 1966, p. 97; 1944-45, p. 82; 1976a, p. 
93; 1976b, 117f).25 However, on those few occasions when Popper makes it clear that 
he intends to extend the methodology of neoclassical economics to the rest of the social 
sciences he seems to have in mind the `objectivist´ SA. That said, some commentators 
have noticed that the rationality requirements are more demanding if RPo rather than 
RPs is adopted (Latsis, 1983; Farmer, 1998; Oakley, 1999; Vanberg, 2002). Notably, 
and in addition to fulfilment of ‘means-rationality’ and ‘ends-rationality’, RPo implies 
the fulfilment of ‘beliefs-rationality’. The combination of these three types of rationality 
yields a type of rationality known as ‘substantive rationality’ (SR) (Simon, 1976). SR is 
a notion of rationality that is concerned solely with the consequences or outcomes of 
rational choice. Specifically, Simon (1976, p.130) denotes human behaviour as being 
substantively rational ‘when it is appropriate to the achievement of given goals within 
the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints’. Thus, as with classical decision 
theory, the interest lies not so much in how decisions are made but in what decisions are 
made. In short, SR constitutes a special case of RPo in so far as, in addition to consistent 
and purposeful behaviour, it is assumed that agents´ beliefs are correct on average. As 
we have noted above, it is this approach to human rationality that lies at the core of the 
maximization assumption in neoclassical economics. Indeed, some scholars have argued 
that RPo is the key principle that underlies the methodology of mainstream economics 
(Farmer, 1998; Oakley, 1999).26  
                                                 
25 It is clear that Popper admired Neoclassical Economics. For instance, he writes that:  
 
      `The social sciences never had for me the same attraction as the theoretical natural sciences. In fact, 
the only theoretical social science which appealed to me was economics´ (Popper, 1976a, p. 121). 
  
    Notwithstanding it, Blaug (1985, p. 287) argues that `Popper knew little about social sciences and less 
about economics´.   
 
26 For instance, Farmer (1998, p. 27) argues that RP is in the `hard core´ of the (Lakatosian) economist´s 
research programme. Matzner & Jarvie (1998) even suggest that Popper´s SA represents a soft version of 
`economic imperialism´ to be distinguished from a strong version they associate with the work of Gary 
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4.1.2.1. Rationalizing the `objectivist´ version of SA 
Now, one can rationalize RPo as a methodological decision according to which 
the theoretician assumes beforehand that the mistakes made by agents (by `mistakes´ we 
mean decisions that are adequate from the point of view of P-S as seen by the agents but 
inadequate from the viewpoint of the P-S as seen by the theoretician) are declared to be 
less interesting for the purpose of understanding agents´ behaviour and, especially, for  
generating predictions than the modelling mistakes made by the theoretician. In other 
words, a rationale for RPo is that, although agents´ mistakes cannot be ruled out a priori 
— so RPo would be compatible with fallibility — nevertheless the theoretician chooses 
to ignore the former for methodological reasons. What are these reasons? First, that the 
theoretician gains little, if anything, by learning that agents make mistakes because (i) 
she already knows it and, more importantly, (ii) that the nature of the mistakes agents 
make is likely to change over time in an unpredictable way and so learning about them 
is of little help for the purpose of generating predictions. To be sure, learning about the 
mistakes agents have made in the past may be helpful if we have the assurance that the 
same mistakes (i.e., mistakes triggered off by the very same factors) will be repeated in 
the future. As we explained above, it is this scenario that may justify the adoption of 
RPs. However, if such condition is not satisfied, there is arguably little we can learn 
from the mistakes made by agents in the past other than for the purpose of historical 
analysis. A second reason for adopting this methodological decision would be that, if 
that decision were not adopted then, in the wake of an erroneous prediction of the model 
the theoretician might be tempted to sidestep its falsification by arguing that agents´ 
beliefs and decisions were, on a particular episode — the one that was subject to the test 
— different from what one would `objectively´ expect and to utilize this `anomaly´ as a 
justification for the (adverse) result of the empirical test. By contrast, if RPo is adopted, 
the onus of proof will inescapably rest on the theoretician´s view of P-S.  
According to the rationale for RPo we have suggested above, ascribing a role to 
agents´ errors in the situational model (i.e., to discrepancies between their view of P-S 
and the theoreticians´ view of P-S) will prevent us from generating predictions unless 
agents´ errors are predictable. Yet, one possible reason why agents´ errors may actually 
be unpredictable is that agents may `learn´ from their past mistakes so that their future 
                                                                                                                                               
Becker. In any case, they recognize that it was Popper — and not Gary Becker — who first formulated a 
programme for extending the logic of economics to the noneconomic social sciences (op. cit., p. 336).   
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mistakes will tend to differ from previous ones. Thus, in order to generate predictions, a 
hypothesis which assumes that agent´s view of P-S does not coincide with the theorist´s 
view of it (i.e., RPs) will need to be coupled to an additional assumption according to 
which agents´ errors tend to persist over time and, hence, are predictable. However, to 
the extent that this assumption implies that agents do not `learn´ from their mistakes, it 
is in conflict with PTKL. To be sure, if agents `learn´ from their previous mistakes so 
that they do not repeat them, their future mistakes will tend to differ from their previous 
mistakes and, unless the range of potential mistakes is limited, their future mistakes will 
thus be unpredictable. By contrast, if the theoretician adopts RPo instead of RPs, this 
problem does not arise because there is no presumption that agents´ view of P-S differs 
from the theoretician´s. As we will argue below, the adoption of RPo actually implies 
the imposition of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents. Does this mean that there 
is no tension between the `objectivist´ version of SA and PTKL? We believe not. Firstly, 
PTKL only implies that agents `learn´ by trial and error-elimination so that behaviour 
that is rational according to PTKL is not necessarily appropriate to the `logic of the 
situation´ faced by agents. To be sure, the errors that agents made in the past occurred in 
the environment that surrounded them at that time so if the latter changes in an 
unpredictable way agents may well make new (and different) errors, i.e., they may make 
decisions that are not appropriate to the `logic of the situation´. Secondly, since the 
theoretician´s view of P-S does not necessarily coincide with agents´ view of it, several 
further assumptions will need to be made to justify the coincidence of the theoreticians´ 
and agents´ views. These additional assumptions are presented and discussed below. In 
any case, we may anticipate that these assumptions are problematic in the sense that if it 
is assumed that agents behave according to PTKL it is doubtful that their decisions will 
be appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ as it is seen by the theoretician, even on 
average. In short, the nature of tension between PTKL and RPs differs from the nature 
of tension between PTKL and RPo in that, in the former case, tension stems from the 
fact that the adoption of RPs implies that agents tend to repeat the same mistakes they 
made in the past in a way that is hardly compatible with `learning´ by trial and error-
elimination as posited in PTKL whereas, in the latter case, it is simply assumed that 
agents´ view of P-S coincides, at least on average, with the theoretician´s view of P-S so 
that their behaviour is always appropriate to the objective `logic of the situation´ yet, as 
we will argue below, the mechanisms by virtue of which such coincidence is justified 
can hardly be reconciled with PTKL.           
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4.1.2.2. How do the views of the agents and the theoretician tend to converge?  
Next, we have suggested above that the adoption of RPo implies de facto the 
imposition of the theoreticians´ view of P-S upon agents´. However, scientists do not 
usually see things this way. An example is mainstream economics where a number of 
mechanisms have been suggested in the literature to (implicitly) justify the adoption of 
RPo. To be sure, such mechanisms are seemingly viewed by mainstream economists as 
reasons why they need not care about agents´ beliefs when reconstructing P-S because 
an `objective´ P-S can be said to exist `out there´ that is sufficiently independent of 
agents´ beliefs so that the theoretician can reconstruct P-S as she sees it. There are two 
mechanisms through which the neglect of agents´ beliefs by the theoretician is normally 
justified: (i) the operation of the `law of large numbers´ in the social domain, and (ii) the 
presence of `learning´ by individuals. However, as we show below both mechanisms are 
problematic. Let us address the first mechanism. According to it, agents´ decisions may 
turn out to be objectively wrong in retrospect but nevertheless their mistakes will tend to 
cancel each other out provided the number of individuals is large enough. The former 
implies that the scope for fallibility at the aggregate level in this version of RPo is 
negligible since it is restricted to random mistakes associated to transitory factors. There 
is textual evidence which suggests that some influential social scientists have implicitly 
resorted to this mechanism to justify the adoption of RPo. For instance, Nobel Laureate 
in Economics John Hicks (1956, p. 55) writes that `the preference hypothesis [in the 
context of neoclassical utility theory] only acquires a prima facie plausibility when it is 
applied to a statistical average´. More explicitly, Gibbard & Varian (1978) describe 
optimizing behaviour by individuals as capturing the ‘central tendency’ of economic 
behaviour or:  
 
‘If deviations are random or more precisely, are not systematic, there might be 
good reason to have some faith in the conclusions of the [economic] model even though 
the assumptions, strictly interpreted, are implausible. Perhaps a case in point is the 
economist´s assumption of perfect optimizing behaviour. Of course, this assumption is 
strictly speaking, false, but, so long as errors in optimization are not systematic, this 
hypothesis may be useful in describing the “central tendency” of economic behaviour. 
Furthermore, in models where individual units´ behaviour is being aggregated, non-
systematic errors may be expected to “wash out” in the process of aggregation’ (op. cit., 
p. 670).  
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Likewise, it has been argued in the sphere of sociology that it is not necessary to 
claim that all agents optimize but, instead, that the tendency to optimize is the most 
important non-idiosyncratic factor at work so that the operation of a sort of ‘law of large 
numbers’ guarantees that optimizing behaviour dominates (Goldthorpe, 1998, p. 169). 
We believe this assumption (i.e., the `law of large numbers´) implicitly lies at the core 
of neoclassical economics where agents are modelled as if they were infallible – when 
they exhibit perfect foresight – or as if their mistakes were random (Muth, 1961). More 
specifically, this assumption is implied when the optimizing assumption is be applied in 
modelling exercises. However, the `law of large numbers´ in statistics assumes that the 
different trials of a stochastic process are: (i) independent and, crucially, (ii) have the 
same distribution so that, as the number of such trials tends to infinity, the probability 
distribution of a random variable concentrates around the finite expected value of each 
of the trials.  
Now, it is unlikely that these conditions will be satisfied in the case of agents´ 
view of P-S. For one thing, there are likely to be significant interdependencies among 
agents´ (subjective) view of P-S owing to the presence of conventional elements so that 
condition (i) is likely to be violated. Further, agents´ (subjective) view of P-S may differ 
substantially from others agents´ which also violates condition (ii). Thus, the conditions 
for reliance on the `law of large numbers´ as it exists in statistics for the purpose of 
providing a rationale for the coincidence, on average, between agents´ view of P-S and 
the theoreticians´ view of P-S are not warranted. Consequently, the adoption of RPo can 
only be justified on strict methodological grounds. That said, we believe that some 
advocates of RPo assume that if the theorist´s view of P-S diverges significantly from 
agents´ view of P-S such discrepancy will tend to be eliminated over time by means of 
other mechanisms such as: (i) trial and error-elimination, and (ii) imitation of successful 
strategies by agents. In other words, advocates of RPo may argue that the occurrence of 
learning at the individual level based on trial and error-elimination or the imitation of 
the successful strategies of others will make agents´ view of P-S eventually converge to 
the theorist´s (objective) view of P-S so that, for the sake of analytical convenience, we 
may freely assume that agents´ beliefs are correct. However, the imitation of successful 
strategies requires that some other agents have previously `learnt´ to perform some tasks 
adequately so that the presence of some kind of learning is a sine qua non condition for 
the imitation of successful strategies to allow some other agents to make decisions that 
are appropriate to the `logic of the situation´. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we will 
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leave aside the latter. In other words, the theorist assumes in this case that the operation 
of a negative feedback mechanism whereby agents systematically revise their beliefs 
until the latter coincide with the theoretician´s view of P-S justifies the adoption of the 
methodological decision to assume that agents´ beliefs are eventually correct. In short, 
`learning´ is the second mechanism (additional to the `law of large numbers´) by means 
of which mainstream economists may try to justify the assumption that agents´ view of 
P-S coincides with the theorist´s.27 For instance, Nobel Laureate R. Lucas characterizes 
the type of situations on which economic theory focuses as the end-result of an adaptive 
learning process:28  
 
                                                 
27 An alternative rationale to agents´ learning process for the adoption of the optimization assumption in 
mainstream economics is the ‘natural’ selection argument. This argument was originally proposed by 
Alchian (1950) in the context of economic competition and since then it has been advocated by a number 
of neoclassical theorists. Alchian (op. cit.) views the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which 
cleverly chooses among actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of `profits´. His argument starts with 
the premise that the realization of profits is the criterion according to which successful firms are selected. 
However, he admits that this process may be independent of the nature of the decision-making processes 
of economic agents. In particular, he recognizes that economic success does not require proper motivation 
but may instead be the outcome of fortuitous circumstances. Further, to the extent that profits accrue only 
to those firms who are better than their competitors, what matters for survival is one’s competitiveness 
relative to the others rather than their absolute proximity to an optimum. Nevertheless, he recognizes that 
conscious or purposeful behaviour (in addition to sheer chance) also plays a role in the selection of firms 
by the market. Two such examples of purposeful behaviour are: (i) imitation of strategies previously 
adopted by successful firms, and (ii) the adoption of trial and error strategies aimed at improving one’s 
adaptation to the environment. However, he makes it clear that the former should not be understood as 
mechanisms through which adequate or `rational´ actions can be selected thereby allowing firms to 
converge to an optimum in the form of profit maximization. This is because the latter would require the 
fulfilment of the two following convergence conditions (Alchian, 1950, p. 219): (i) that every single trial 
must be classifiable either as a success or as a failure, and (ii) the continual rising toward some optimum 
optimorum without the occurrence of intervening descents. In this respect, he writes: 
 
‘These convergence conditions do not apply to a changing environment, for there can be no 
observable comparison of the result of an action with any other… As a consequence, the measure of 
goodness of actions in anything except a tolerable-intolerable sense is lost, and the possibility of an 
individual´s converging to the optimum activity via a trial-and-error process disappears. Trial and error 
becomes survival or death. It cannot serve as a basis of the individual´s method of convergence to a 
“maximum” or optimum position.’ (op. cit.).   
 
   The upshot of Alchian´s discussion is that successful adaptation within a stable environment may give 
ex-post the appearance of rational or optimizing behaviour at the individual level even though no ex-ante 
rational calculation actually occurred. Further, and as Loasby (1999, pp. 20-21; see also Vromen, 1995, 
pp. 32-33) insists, the economic `survival´ argument can only allow its advocates to claim that surviving 
firms will have achieved results which are, on average, closer to the maximisation of profits than those 
firms that did not survive and, hence, it does not allow them to use it as a justification for the occurrence 
of optimization at the individual level as Friedman (1953, p. 22), for instance, does. Although with 
significant qualifications, developments of Alchian´s argument can be found in Friedman (1953) and 
Becker (1962) and critical assessments of the `survival´ argument are in Vromen (1995), Loasby (1999) 
and Lagueux (2010).   
  
28 By contrast, Arrow (1986, p. S385) criticizes the view that the optimizing assumption can be justified 
as being the result of a process of learning and adaptation. 
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‘Economics has tended to focus on situations in which the agent can be expected 
to “know” or to have learned the consequences of different actions so that his observed 
choices reveal stable features of his underlying preferences… Technically, I think of 
economics as studying decision rules that are steady states of some adaptive process, 
decision rules that are found to work over a range of situations and hence are no longer 
revised appreciably as more experience accumulates…’ (Lucas, 1986, p. 218).  
 
However, for this feedback mechanism to be effective, it is necessary that: (i) the 
former is fast and accurate enough, and (ii) P-S remains constant until the convergence 
process has been completed.29 Yet, as Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. 90) insist, such 
conditions rarely arise in the real world. In particular, the former can hardly be satisfied 
when agents make decisions in a changing environment in which it is hard to ascertain 
whether an observed outcome is a direct consequence of our decisions or a consequence 
of someone else´s decisions. Furthermore, Popper (1994, p. 4) insists that no optimal 
state of adaptation is ever reached by the application of the method of trial and error-
elimination owing to: (i) the continuous change in the environmental situation, and (ii) 
agents´ inability to eliminate all their errors. That said, we believe that it is the reliance 
on the alleged efficacy of `learning´ at the individual level that makes some scientists 
implicitly assume that any negative result that occurs in the wake of empirical tests can 
be ascribed only (or mainly) to their own modelling mistakes (i.e., to their own failure 
to capture the `objective´ P-S properly) rather than to agents´ mistakes. Thus, although 
RPo accounts for the presence of learning by agents, it exhibits some clear differences 
with PTKL in that `learning´ at the individual level in the latter is unlikely to warrant 
that agents´ decisions will be adequate to the `logic of the situation´ as it is seen by the 
theoretician.  
 
4.1.3. The dichotomy between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour 
The notion of rationality that is concerned with the consequences or outcomes of 
rational choice is known as ‘substantive’ rationality (SR). Specifically, Simon (1976, p. 
130) identifies human behaviour as being substantively rational ‘when it is appropriate 
                                                 
29 Wible (1984-85, p. 271) characterizes the approach to decision-making and expectations formation 
embedded in neoclassical economics as one of instantaneous rational assessment and hypothesizes that 
its origin is the emphasis in the ‘logic of justification’ of knowledge rather in the ‘process of discovery’ of 
knowledge made by proponents of the logical positivist school of philosophy.   
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to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and 
constraints’. According to this definition, rational behaviour is a type of purposeful or 
intentional behaviour directed towards a goal, e.g. the maximization of utility. As with 
classical decision theory, the interest lies not so much in how decisions are made but in 
what decisions are made. According to Simon (1965, p. 84), theoretical models based 
on ‘substantively’ rational individuals share a common framework characterised by: (i) 
a set of alternative courses of action that are available to the individual, (ii) (perfect) 
knowledge that permits the individual to predict the precise consequences of choosing 
any possible alternative30, and (iii) a criterion for determining which set of potential 
consequences she prefers. In such models, rationality is usually defined as ‘the ability of 
actors to select that course of action which leads to the most preferred set of predicted 
consequences’ (op. cit.). SR assumes that the surrounding environment is either known 
or knowable (i.e., the stochastic environment is stable), and individuals have sufficient 
cognitive abilities to deal with a complex reality. SR is the type of rationality actors are 
assumed to exhibit in those models that adopt strong versions of RPo such as the ones 
that prevail, for instance, in mainstream economics. In particular, agents who exhibit SR 
must fulfil ends-rationality, means-rationality, and beliefs-rationality. This is shown in 
the third row of Table 1 below. In turn, this implies that behaviour that falls short of 
maximizing is deemed ‘irrational’ (Becker, 1962). Specifically, a violation by agents of 
either means-rationality or beliefs-rationality is interpreted in mainstream economics as 
signalling `irrational´ behaviour. Likewise, Popper ([1943a] 1966, p. 97) explains that 
`when we speak of "rational behaviour" or of "irrational behaviour" then we mean 
behaviour which is, or which is not, in accordance with the logic of the situation´. Thus, 
Popper´s notion of rationality in the context of SA bears, arguably, a strong resemblance 
to the notion of rationality in mainstream economics.  
That said, we believe that the charge of `irrationality´ is a direct implication of 
the adoption of RPo and, particularly, of the imposition upon agents of the theoretician´s 
view of P-S. More specifically, we believe that the `irrationality´ charge that is applied 
to those agents who fail to maximize (a given pre-specified objective function) obeys 
ultimately to a failure to distinguish between the `rationality of the theoretician´ and the 
`rationality of agents´. For instance, the implicit assumption by mainstream economists 
                                                 
30 In the absence of perfect foresight, the notion of ‘substantive’ rationality usually requires the existence 
of a stable stochastic environment that allows individuals to confidently extrapolate the past into the 
future as in, for instance, ‘subjective expected utility’ (SEU) theory.  
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that agents´ subjective view of P-S coincides, at least on average, with the theoretician´s 
view of P-S logically implies that behaviour that falls short of the rationality standard 
ascribed to the theoretician is `irrational´. However, we believe that if agents´ view of P-
S does not coincide with the theoretician´s then the former cannot be blamed for being 
`irrational´. In particular, an individual cannot be said to be `irrational´ if her beliefs are 
incorrect. Rather, as PTKL has it, she can only be said to be `irrational´ if she refuses to 
revise her (wrong) beliefs.   
The counterpart to SR is the notion of ‘procedural’ rationality (PR). According 
to Simon (1976, p. 131), ‘behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of 
appropriate deliberation’.31 PR shifts attention from the consequences of choice to the 
process of choice where the emphasis is placed in the presence of a decision process 
based on the use of simple heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’.32 PR can thus be characterised 
as the ability of actors to use simple heuristics that are adequate for a specific purpose. 
Reliance on simple heuristics to make decisions assumes that, most of the time, actors 
face situations characterised by (i) Knightian uncertainty (Knight, [1921]1971), or (ii) 
where the ‘optimal’ solution is intractable. The former corresponds to scenarios where 
either we do not have an exhaustive list of potential consequences of a certain decision 
or else to situations where, even if such list were available, it is impossible to attach 
numerical probabilities to them. In turn, the latter corresponds to situations where there 
are insurmountable constraints on the ability of agents: (i) to identify optimal actions 
given a set of beliefs and desires, and (ii) to acquire the information that is relevant to 
the problem at hand. In contrast, SR implies that agents make decisions by following 
the prescriptions of Bayes’s rule or by maximizing expected utility, as in SEU theory.33  
                                                 
31 Note the similarity of this definition with Koertge´s (1975) reformulation of RP provided above. 
  
32 PR is coupled to its sister notion of ‘bounded’ rationality (BR). According to Simon (1979), economic 
agents´ knowledge is subject to three different types of constraints: (i) limited ability to process, analyse, 
and store information, (ii) uncertainty, and (iii) the presence of social institutions. BR stems from the fact 
that the existence of these constraints prevents economic agents from ‘optimizing’. Simon coined the term 
‘satisficing’ to denote a decision-making rule that attempts to meet an acceptability (minimum) threshold. 
In contrast to ‘satisficing’ behaviour, the purpose of optimal decision-making is to find the best option 
available.     
 
33 According to Volz & Gigerenzer (2012, p. 1), most of the time we make decisions under Knightian 
uncertainty, while situations of known risk are relatively rare and found mostly in gambling. They note 
that Savage (1954, p. 16), one of the fathers of the theory of choice under uncertainty, made it clear that 
applying Bayesian theory to decisions in uncertain worlds would not make sense because there is no way 
to know all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities. Likewise, Arrow (2004, p. 54) argues that in 
uncertain, ill-specified worlds, maximization of expected utility ‘has no meaning at all’.       
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 Now, we believe PR captures properly the type of rationality implied by PTKL. 
As we noted above, the acquisition of knowledge in Popper’s account runs parallel to 
the process of adaptation to a partly unknown (and changing) environment in which 
some of the errors made in the past by individuals are purged by virtue of a learning 
process that consists essentially of subjecting their hypotheses or conjectures to trial and 
error-elimination. Crucially, Popper emphasises that our adaptation to the surrounding 
environment is often successful and often unsuccessful. More specifically, some errors 
will escape and this possibility is one of the reasons our knowledge is always fallible 
(Popper, 1990, p. 47). In turn, Popper (1994, p. 4) insists that the systematic application 
of the method of trial and error-elimination will not result in an ‘optimum’ adaptation to 
the surrounding environment. Instead, and due to the partial elimination of errors, our 
adaptation to the environment is always imperfect. It follows from this that the observed 
states of adaptation can never be the result of convergence to an optimum. Should all 
errors be systematically purged and the environment be stable, the process of adaptation 
to the latter would eventually be perfect and only then could the state of adaptation be 
interpreted as the outcome of a convergence to an optimum. In this scenario, individuals 
would be fallible only to the extent that the changes in the environment cannot be fully 
anticipated. The method of trial and error-elimination thus consists of an adaptation 
mechanism whereby errors tend to be eliminated and new hypotheses are then subject to 
trial. As some commentators note (Kerstenetzky, 2009; Lagueux, 2006), the watershed 
between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour in PTKL is marked by the unwillingness of 
agents to correct their wrong beliefs or, as it were, by the incorrigibility of their beliefs. 
This is clearly stated by Popper in the following quotation: 
       
 `The main distinction, I suggest, is that a healthy person´s beliefs are not 
incorrigible: a healthy person shows a certain readiness to correct his beliefs. He may do 
so only reluctantly, yet he is nevertheless ready to correct his views under the pressure 
of events, of the opinions held by others, and of critical arguments… the mentality of 
the man with definitely fixed views, the "committed" man, is akin to that of the 
madman… but in so far as he is committed, he is not rational´ (Popper, 1985, p. 364; 
1994, p. 180, emphasis added). 
 
 This suggests, as noted above, that there are two different notions of rationality 
in Popper´s work: (i) behaviour that is in accordance with the `logic of the situation´ 
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(Popper, [1943a] 1966, p. 97; 1944-45, sections 31 & 32), and (ii) willingness to revise 
one´s wrong beliefs (Popper, 1985, p. 364. We have argued above that there is a certain 
tension between these two notions of rationality when the relation is approached from 
the standpoint of the `rationality of the agents´ and we will argue below that there is no 
such tension when the relation is approached from the standpoint of the `rationality of 
the theoretician´.       
 Next, unlike models based on RPo, both praxeology and models based on RPs 
imply that agents´ view of P-S may be mistaken and, hence, that their decisions may 
turn out to be wrong ex-post. In the case of RPs, the theoretician is assumed to adopt the 
viewpoint of actors and, thus, she is supposed to be able to distinguish between her own 
view of P-S (i.e., the `rationality of the observer´) and agents´ view of P-S (i.e., the 
`rationality in the observed´). Further, in the case of models based on RPs, agents are 
assumed to exhibit means-rationality (in addition to `ends-rationality´) which implies 
that their mistakes can only be ascribed to wrong beliefs and not to an inconsistent or 
inadequate behaviour given the information available to them. However, as far as agents 
are concerned, there is no mechanism that ensures an adequate, let alone an efficient, 
use by them of the available information regardless of the accuracy of the latter. Rather, 
decision-making in a context of pervasive uncertainty can only be the result of a process 
of systematic deliberation by agents. In other words, although we cannot rule out that a 
given correct decision is the outcome of sheer chance, it is much more likely that correct 
decisions given the knowledge and information that agents possess will be the result of 
agents´ systematic deliberation. Therefore, the type of rationality agents exhibit if RPs is 
adopted can be denoted as `procedural´. In turn, this implies that PTKL and RPs share 
the feature that agents are fallible, i.e., their beliefs may be wrong ex-post. By contrast, 
as we explained above, agents´ fallibility is negligible in case RPo is adopted since, a 
priori, individuals can make mistakes but their mistakes are assumed to cancel out at the 
aggregate level.       
 Now, by adopting RPs the theoretician seeks to identify agents´ partially wrong 
beliefs and thus to explain their behaviour accordingly (i.e., by stressing the divergence 
of agents´ behaviour from what one would expect if their beliefs were correct). By 
contrast, it is quite unlikely that the theorist can provide a `rational´ reconstruction of 
agents´ apparently wrong behaviour by pointing instead to their inadequate behaviour 
given their correct beliefs (i.e., to absence of means-rationality). To be sure, to provide 
such an account of agents´ inadequate behaviour by appealing to the notion that some 
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agents exhibit, for instance, miopic behaviour or weak (or lack of) will, implies a large 
element of psychologism and, hence, a loss of inter-subjectivity, accountability, and 
transparency in theoretical analysis. Further, such a diagnose of inadequate behaviour as 
based on a violation of the assumption of means-rationality may apply to some or even 
to very few individuals but certainly it will not apply to the majority of them which, 
according to us, precludes its use in the social sciences. This suggests that, even though 
it is not true that agents always make an adequate use of the information that is available 
to them and, to the extent that we accept as universally valid the assumption that agents´ 
behaviour is always goal-oriented, it is unclear whether we can speak of a dichotomy 
between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour by agents in models which adopt RPs. By 
contrast, to the extent that agents only exhibit ends-rationality in praxeologic models, 
we cannot speak of the existence of such a dichotomy in the latter. All this is illustrated 
in Table 1 below.  
 
Approach Beliefs Rationality Dichotomy  
Praxeology Right or wrong ex-post 
Ends-rationality 
(instrumental) No  
Subjectivist 
SA 
Right or wrong 
ex-post 
Ends & means-
rationality 
(procedural) 
? 
Objectivist  
SA 
Right `on 
average´ 
Ends, means & 
beliefs-rationality 
(substantive) 
Irrationality 
  failure of 
either means 
or beliefs-
rationality (or 
both) 
PTKL Right or wrong ex-post 
Ends-rationality 
(procedural) 
Irrationality 
  
incorrigibility  
Table 1. Classification of approaches to rationality 
 
 Finally, let us note that it is the existence or otherwise of a dichotomy between 
`rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour by agents in the context of SA that was the object of 
an exchange between Nadeau (1993) and Lagueux (1993, 2010). In their contributions, 
which focus on the epistemological status of RP, Nadeau (1993) first argued that RPs is 
the correct interpretation of Popper´s Rationality Principle and subsequently argued that 
the former is a metaphysical statement and, as such, it is a priori true and irrefutable. By 
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contrast, Lagueux (1993) held that RP should rather be interpreted as a methodological 
principle and, hence, that it is false but approximately true in the sense there may be 
some instances where it does not hold. Nevertheless, he (as Popper does) believes that 
RP is a sufficiently good approximation to the truth and defends a sort of `statistical´ 
justification of RP in so far as he points out that `the rationality principle can be said to 
be "approximately true" only to the extent that it applies to a large number of cases´ 
(Lagueux, op. cit., p. 475). Both authors make use of Popper´s example of the `flustered 
driver´ to substantiate their arguments: 
 
 `For the rationality principle seems to me to be clearly false ― even in its 
weakest zero formulation, which may be put like this: “Agents always act in a manner 
appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves.”… In think one can see 
easily that this is not so. One has only to observe flustered drivers trying to get out of a 
traffic jam, or desperately trying to park their cars when there is hardly any parking 
space to be found, or none at all, in order to see that we do not always act in accordance 
with the rationality principle… Moreover, there are, obviously, vast personal 
differences, not only in knowledge and skill ― these are part of the situation ― but also 
in assessing or understanding a situation; and this means that some people will act 
appropriately and others not´ (Popper, 1985, p. 361; 1994, p. 172, emphasis added).  
 
 Building on this, Lagueux comments:  
 
 `Suppose that we try to explain the [Popper´s] example of the flustered driver 
using the rationality principle as understood by Popper, that is to say, as a principle that 
is empirical and false. It is clear that, in such a case, the rationality principle could be 
held responsible for the failure of an explanatory theory that was supported by it´  
(Lagueux, 1993, p. 475).  
   
 By contrast, Nadeau (1993) writes: 
 
 `It seems to me to be evident that the RPs is logically irrefutable, in exactly the 
same way that, for Popper, probabilistic assertions or metaphysical statements are 
irrefutable... My critique of Popper can be clarified further by a brief examination of his 
example of the flustered driver... Popper uses this example to falsify the RP, but how 
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does this example work exactly? It merely makes it apparent that the real or objective 
situation is such that, in spite of the fact that there are no available parking spaces, the 
driver persists in trying to park his car. However, it is rather surprising that, in his 
analysis of the situation, Popper does not connect the irrationality of the driver to the 
contradiction between the information that the latter has at his disposal and the chosen 
course of action. For if the driver does not know or does not believe that the parking 
space where he is desperately trying to park his car is insufficient, then his behavior 
does not contradict the RPs´ (Nadeau, 1993, pp. 461-62, emphasis added).  
 
In an attempt to clarify this controversy Lagueux (2010, pp. 104f) notes that, the 
`flustered driver´ in Popper´s example, represents an atypical behaviour that cannot be 
excluded and that such behaviour can be said to be irrational. However, he recognizes 
that, `if we base our judgement on the description alone, we cannot be sure that the 
flustered driver´s action is really irrational´ (op. cit., p. 104). This is because we can 
never be certain that the agent sees P-S in a way that renders his behaviour appropriate. 
In other words, according to Lagueux (op. cit.) the same behaviour can be interpreted as 
either `rational´ or `irrational´ depending on the observer´s viewpoint. We thus believe 
Lagueux (op. cit.) ultimately admits that there is no objective or neutral way of deciding 
whether someone actually exhibits `means-rationality´ when there is no assurance that 
her beliefs are correct, i.e., when she does not exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. We conclude 
that, in the particular case of RPs, the dividing line between `rational´ and `irrational´ 
behaviour is unclear.   
 
4.1.4. What version of RP is `preferable´ in the social sciences?   
The theoretician´s methodological decision to ignore agents´ mistakes if RPo is 
adopted implies, for the reasons expounded above, assuming that agents´ (subjective) 
view of P-S converges over time to, or else, does not diverge in a significant way from 
the theoretician´s view of P-S. More specifically, we argued above that the adoption of 
RPo implicitly implies the imposition upon agents of the theoretician´s view of P-S. By 
contrast, and despite the above-mentioned tension between PTKL and RPs, we believe 
that a more natural strategy in the theoretical social sciences is to adopt agents´ view of 
P-S. There are at least three reasons for this. First, as Popper (1972, p. 179) admits, both 
the theoreticians´ and agents´ view of P-S are conjectured. Second, and more important, 
there is Hayek´s notion that, unlike the facts of the natural sciences — which are largely 
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independent of the theoretician´s viewpoint — the `facts´ of the social sciences are all 
interpretations (Hayek, 1943).34 That is, according to Hayek, the concepts we use in the 
social sciences are not just abstractions like the ones used in the physical and natural 
sciences but they abstract from all the physical characteristics of the objects they refer 
to. Hayek (op. cit., p. 3) denotes the concepts we use in the theoretical social sciences as 
`teleological´ because, as he explains, such concepts can only be defined by postulating 
relations between three different terms: (i) a purpose, (ii) somebody who holds it, and 
(iii) an `object´ which the person in question thinks to be a suitable means to achieve 
that purpose. As he explains: 
 
`We could say that all these objects are defined not in terms of their “real” 
properties but in terms of opinions people hold about them. In short, in the social 
sciences the things are what people think they are. Money is money, a word is a word, a 
cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are. That this is not more 
obvious is due to the historical accident that in the world in which we live the 
knowledge of most people is approximately similar to our own… We are likely, for 
example, to think of the relationship between parent and child as an “objective” fact. 
But, when we use this concept in studying family life, what is relevant is not that x is 
the natural offspring of y but that either or both believe this to be the case´ (op. cit., 
emphasis added).    
 
Third, Hayek (op. cit.) also argues that in the type of P-S analysed in the social 
sciences agents´ interpretation of P-S becomes an `integral´ part of the latter thereby 
affecting subsequent developments. In particular, to the extent that agents understand P-
S via the internal models they create for that purpose, their understanding of the former 
will affect their decisions and, through this route, they may affect P-S itself. Let us use 
the example of `bank panics´ to illustrate this idea. The occurrence of a `bank panic´ in 
a private bank is not necessarily related to the actual liquidity position of the bank. 
Rather, the occurrence of a `bank panic´ is more likely to depend on its depositors´ view 
about the ability of the bank to cash their deposits on demand. If depositors have doubts 
about the ability of the bank to comply with its obligations when the former attempt to 
withdraw money from their accounts (and regardless of the `true´ liquidity position of 
                                                 
34 This idea is discussed in detail also in Hayek (1942).  
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the bank), a `bank panic´ will likely ensue and the bank will actually become illiquid. 
This is not to deny that depositors commonly take into account the `objective´ indicators 
related to the liquidity of the bank when evaluating the likelihood of the private bank 
going illiquid. Rather, our argument is that what really matters as far as depositors´ 
decisions are concerned is not the (objective) information provided by the liquidity 
indicators but agents´ (subjective) evaluation of them. However, if the latter affects the 
former, then P-S is not independent of depositors´ views and, at least in this example, it 
is not sound to argue that there is an `objective´ P-S which is, in principle, knowable by 
the theoretician but not by the agents. This idea, we believe, is captured in the following 
comment by Hayek:  
 
`Perhaps the relevant distinction comes out most clearly in the general and 
obvious statement that no superior knowledge the observer may possess about the 
object, but which is not possessed by the acting person, can help us in understanding the 
action in question´ (op. cit., emphasis added).   
 
Unlike the presupposition by social scientists (and Popper) that the theoretician 
possesses a wider perspective of P-S than agents do, Hayek (op. cit.) suggests that, since 
P-S depends on agents´ interpretation no matter whether the latter is right or wrong, it 
follows that the theoretician does not stand in a privileged position to observe the 
`objective´ P-S. Thus, and for these reasons, we believe that the `natural´ strategy for 
the theoretician is to seek to capture P-S as agents see it. That is to say, if there is not an 
`objective´ P-S that is (fully) independent of agents´ views, then the theoretician has a 
better chance of understanding social phenomena if she adopts agents´ viewpoint. This 
is not to deny, however, that there may be some circumstances in which the theoretician 
may prefer instead, for methodological reasons, to adopt RPo. In particular, there may 
be circumstances where P-S may be sufficiently independent from agents´ beliefs as to 
make it convenient to adopt RPo. Be that as it may, the adoption of RPo will actually 
imply the imposition of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents or, as Schumpeter 
(1984) would put it, the model will capture the `rationality of the theoretician´ instead of 
the `rationality in the observed´.   
Now, the former discussion suggests that RPo represents a limit or extreme case 
of SA. In particular, we believe RPo represents a limit case of SA based on the implicit 
assumption that P-S is (fully) independent of agents´ beliefs and that, consequently, the 
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theoretician can acquire `objective´ knowledge about P-S that is, somehow, superior to 
agents´. By contrast, Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences 
imply that there are several elements of P-S such as the knowledge and information that 
agents possess and the social (and even physical) constraints their behaviour is subject 
to which depend on agents´ beliefs so the theoretician cannot claim to possess superior 
knowledge about them. In other words, the adoption of RPo could a priori be justified if 
the theoretician were able to acquire knowledge of P-S that is not available to agents but 
if, as Hayek (op. cit.) suggests, this is not the case, that is, if P-S consists, at least partly, 
of agents´ beliefs, if follows that RPo constitutes a limit case whose adoption implies 
imposing the theoreticians´ (allegedly superior) view of P-S on agents. 
 
4.1.5. A reformulation of `situational analysis´  
Popper apparently ignores both Hayek´s ideas about the peculiar `facts´ of the 
social sciences and his own ideas about indeterminism in the natural sciences in his 
discussion of SA. For instance, in his most detailed presentation of SA (Popper, 1994, p. 
183, note 19), he argues that, if RPo is adopted, then the theorist reconstructs P-S as it 
actually is whereas, if RPs is adopted, she reconstructs P-S as agents actually see it. 
Yet, the way this is expressed by Popper is somewhat ambiguous since, in his attempt to 
clarify this issue, he seems to refer only to historical interpretation and, thus, it is 
unclear whether the distinction he draws between RPo and RPs also applies to the other 
social sciences. Hereafter, we assume that it does but we should like to make it clear 
that this is our interpretation. Specifically, he writes that:  
 
`It seems to me now that there are at least three senses of `rationality´ (and, 
accordingly, of the `rationality principle´), all objective, yet differing with regard to the 
objectivity of the situation in which the agent is acting: (1) The situation as it actually 
was ― the objective situation which the historian tries to reconstruct. Part of this 
objective situation is (2) The situation as the agent actually saw it. But I suggest that 
there is a third sense intermediate between (1) and (2): (3) The situation as the agent 
could (within the objective situation) have seen it, and perhaps ought to have seen it´ 
(Popper, 1994, p. 183, footnote 19). 
      
The previous quotation highlights that, when drawing a distinction between RPo 
and RPs, Popper assumes that the theoretician possesses knowledge that is superior to 
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agents´. Otherwise, he could not have defined the third and intermediate sense of RP as 
one in which P-S is `as the agent could (within the objective situation) have seen it, and 
perhaps ought to have seen it´ (op. cit.). That is, the explicit reference by Popper to the 
P-S `as the agents could and perhaps ought to have seen it´ logically implies that he is 
assuming implicitly that there exists an `objective´ P-S and that the theoretician is in a 
better position than agents to observe it. Thus, we think Popper fails to take on board 
Hayek´s ideas about the peculiar `facts´ of the social sciences as well as his own views 
about indeterminism in the natural sciences. This takes us to our following claim. We 
believe that, arguably, the real difference between RPo and RPs is not that in the former 
the theorist reconstructs P-S as it actually is (even if understood as being conjectural) 
whereas in the latter she reconstructs it as agents actually see it (also understood in a 
conjectural way) but, instead, that in the former the theorist reconstructs P-S as she sees 
it whereas, in the latter, the theorist reconstructs it as she believes agents see it. This 
suggests that the difference between RPo and RPs in this reformulated framework is not 
the `objectivity´ of the approach ― because both the theorist´s and agents´ view of P-S 
are subjective ― but the degree in which the subjectivity of the theorist manifests itself; 
in the case of RPo the implied subjectivity of the theorist is of a `first degree´ because it 
is her (direct) view of P-S that is at stake whereas in the case of RPs the subjectivity of 
the theorist is of a `second degree´ because in that case it is her view about agents´ view 
of P-S.  
Let us put it another way, if RPo is adopted the theorist reconstructs P-S as she 
sees it and, consequently, different theorists may reconstruct it in different ways (as it is 
commonly the case in the theoretical social sciences). Likewise, if RPs is adopted the 
theorist will reconstruct P-S as she thinks agents see it. Again, in this second scenario, 
different theorists may have very different views about how agents see P-S and, hence, 
may produce different theories about the same phenomenon. The reason is that, if P-S 
is, at least partly, as agents see it, then it follows that Popper´s distinction between P-S 
`as it actually is´ and P-S `as agents see it´ makes little sense. Indeed, we may add that 
in the extreme case in which P-S fully coincides with agents´ views (e.g., the Beauty 
Contest metaphor), P-S is as agents see it and, therefore, RPo and RPs would become 
equivalent if they were defined as Popper does.     
Now, this suggests that, as we show in Chart 1 below, SA exhibits a spectrum of 
potential scenarios according to the degree of independence of P-S from agents´ beliefs. 
At one extreme of the spectrum there are those cases characterized by full coincidence 
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of P-S with agents´ beliefs or, as it were, by the absence of elements in P-S whose 
properties can be said to be (fully) independent from agents´ beliefs. Again, an example 
of this scenario is Keynes´ Beauty Contest metaphor in which there are no objective 
`facts´ the theoretician can observe because agents´ opinions about the (relative) beauty 
of the ladies portrayed in the photos are subjective. At the other extreme of the spectrum 
there is the typical scenario in the natural and physical sciences in which the `facts´ can 
be said to be fully independent from the observers´ viewpoint. Hayek´s (1943) suggests 
that in the social sciences there is no such scenario since P-S is never independent from 
agents´ beliefs and, hence, if we take Hayek´s ideas on board the former can be said to 
be a limit or extreme case. Between these two extreme cases there is a spectrum of 
potential P-S characterized by different positive degrees of dependence of P-S upon 
agents´ beliefs so that the lower the degree of dependence the closer the scenario will be 
to RPo. Finally, let us add that the case known as `self-fulfilling´ expectations (Merton, 
1948) would correspond to the case in which agents´ beliefs, no matter whether they are 
right or wrong, bring about a change in P-S so that the latter eventually converges to the 
former. In our framework, this could only occur if P-S were at one end of the above-
mentioned spectrum; the one characterised by coincidence of P-S with agents´ beliefs.     
 
Chart 1. Spectrum of scenarios according to the degree of `independence´ of P-S from  
                agents´ beliefs  
 
     Fully 
independent 
(e.g., natural 
 sciences)   
 
Let us finish off this section by adding that the former discussion highlights that, 
if RPo is adopted, the null hypothesis in an empirical test is not that the theorist´s view 
of the typical P-S is correct, as it is usually believed, but rather that agents´ view of the 
typical P-S coincides, on average, with the theorist´s. That is to say, to the extent that 
agents´ view of P-S is an integral part of the latter, only if there is a large coincidence 
(on average) between the agents´ and the theorist´ view of P-S will the hypothesis have 
a chance of withstanding the onus of proof when subject to an empirical test. In other 
words, an empirical test is not, if RPo is adopted, a contrast between the theorist´s view 
of P-S and the `objective´ facts, as is the case in the natural sciences. Rather, as we have 
                  
Fully  
dependent 
(e.g., Beauty  
Contest) 
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argued above, the `facts´ of the social sciences are largely interpretations and, hence, 
rejection of the null hypothesis in this case does not imply that the theorist´s view of P-
S does not capture the `objective´ facts appropriately since there are no `objective´ facts 
in the social sciences but, rather, that the theorist´s view of P-S does not coincide, on 
average, with agents´ view of P-S.     
       
4.2. PTKL versus SA: the `rationality of the theoretician´  
 The last issue we should like to address is the compatibility or otherwise of the 
notion of rationality that stems from PTKL and SA as viewed from the perspective of 
the theoretician. If the discussion in the previous section has focused on the rationality 
of the agents who are the object of modelling by the theoretician, this section focuses on 
the `rationality of the theoretician´ or, as Schumpeter (1984) denotes it, the `rationality 
of the observer´. We believe that the apparently irreconcilable notions of rationality that 
stem from PTKL and SA when looked at from the standpoint of the agents consist, when 
approached from the standpoint of the theoretician, of the application of PTKL to two 
different problems. First, we share Lagueux´s argument that `true´ rationality in Popper 
actually consists of the corrigibility of one´s beliefs (Lagueux, 2006, p. 202).35 Second, 
and according to Popper, science represents a particular version of PTKL characterized 
by the application of the `critical method´:    
 
 `The difference between the amoeba and Einstein is that, although both make 
use of the method of trial and error or elimination, the amoeba dislikes erring while 
Einstein is intrigued by it: he consciously searches for his errors in the hope of learning 
by their discovery and elimination. The method of science is the critical method´ 
(Popper, 1972, p. 70).   
 
 Now, if science is characterized as the application of the `critical method´ to the 
object of knowledge, we may rationalize SA as the specific application of the ´critical 
method´ to the social sciences. That is, the theoretician of the social sciences proposes a 
reconstruction of the P-S in which actors find themselves by formulating a conjectural 
                                                 
35 For instance, in The Open Society and its Enemies, Popper ([1943a] 1966, p. 97) states that `the method 
of applying a situational logic to the social sciences is not based on any psychological assumption 
concerning the rationality (or otherwise) of "human nature"´. In this respect, Oakley (1999, p. 35) notes 
that Popper stresses in his Harvard lecture (Popper, 1985, 1994) that, in the context of SA, `rationality had 
no ontological significance and was not intended as a theory of human action´.   
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situational model where they make decisions on the basis of systematic deliberation. As 
such, the situational model proposed is only a conjecture according to which the former 
constitutes an `adequate´ oversimplification of the relevant P-S or: 
 
`By conjectural analysis I mean a certain kind of tentative or conjectural 
explanation of some human action which appeals to the situation in which the agent 
finds himself… Admittedly, no creative action can ever be fully explained. 
Nevertheless, we can try, conjecturally, to give an idealized reconstruction of the 
problem situation in which the agent found himself, and to that extent make the action 
“understandable” (or “rationally understandable”)…´ (Popper, 1972, p. 179).   
 
The situational model constructed will then be subject to close scrutiny by the 
scientific community which will tell us the extent to which the different elements of the 
hypothetical P-S need to be modified. To the extent that the elements of the hypothetical 
P-S can be properly identified (i.e., it should consist of a set of observable elements 
such as physical and social constraints and assumptions about agents´ knowledge and 
information) both the situational model and the results of the empirical tests can be, in 
principle, openly criticised by the scientific community. That is, the significance of the 
situational model is that it is the `object´ against which criticism may be directed given 
the prior methodological decision to immunize RP from potential refutation. In turn, the 
role of RP (regardless of the specific version adopted) is to facilitate the implementation 
of the `critical method´ by helping scientists identify the `logic of the situation´ captured 
in the situational model. In this respect, it has been argued elsewhere that, in the context 
of Popper´s distinction among three ontological domains, the claim to objectivity in 
World 3 ― which consists of knowledge or thought in an objective sense such as 
problems, theories, and arguments ― stems from the notion that knowledge in World 3 
`resides in recorded form outside the mind of any agent, even its originator, and is, in 
principle, accessible by any other agent in that recorded form´ (Oakley, 2002, p. 464; 
also Popper, 1972, pp. 108-9). As Sassower (2006, p. 104) has observed, Popper `saw 
rationality as the way to intersubjectivity, because it is too much to expect objectivity´. 
In the absence of an `animating principle´ such as RP, it would be very hard to logically 
connect the elements of the situational model in an understandable way. 
     What is crucial, however, is that the situational model will undergo successive 
changes and refinements (that will let it acquire greater accuracy in the explanation of 
 52
social phenomena) in the aftermath of `rational´ criticism by the scientific community. 
Viewed from this standpoint, it does not make any difference whether the theoretician 
adopts RPo or RPs as long as the situational model is subject to close scrutiny by other 
members of the scientific community. Then, as the situational model undergoes further 
refinements or modifications new predictions and explanations may eventually emerge. 
It is clear then that, as long as social scientists modify their models in order to make 
them capable of providing increasingly accurate explanations of social phenomena, 
their behaviour can be characterized as being `corrigible´ and, hence, as sticking to the 
type of rationality we have associated with PTKL. We may thus conclude that, although 
there is some tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is approached from the 
standpoint of `the rationality of agents´ such tension does not arise when such relation is 
approached instead from the standpoint of the `rationality of the theoretician´.            
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
A number of commentators have noted that there are two different approaches to 
rationality in Popper´s philosophy: the approach stemming from his evolutionary theory 
of knowledge and learning (PTKL) and the approach embodied in so-called `Situational 
Analysis´ (SA) and associated to his famous `Rationality Principle´ (RP). According to 
the former, we `learn´ by subjecting our hypotheses to trial and discarding those ones 
which turn out to be wrong. In addition, all knowledge is conjectural and fallible. In this 
setting, science is the `highest´ form of knowledge acquisition and is characterized by 
the subjecting of scientific theories to the most severe forms of criticism by members of 
the scientific community including, of course, empirical testing. The notion of `critical 
rationalism´ was coined to capture Popper´s thesis that the way to maximize the rate of 
expansion of knowledge is to subject theories to an optimal amount of criticism. The 
notion of human rationality that stems from PTKL consists of the corrigibility of our 
(wrong) beliefs. In other words, PTKL implies that being `rational´ consists of revising 
our beliefs when they turn out to be wrong. Therefore, individuals who fail to do so are 
`irrational´. SA represents Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences. In 
turn, RP is a methodological principle according to which agents always act in a way 
that is adequate or appropriate to their problem-situation (P-S). It follows that, in the 
context of SA, `rational´ behaviour consists of acting in a way that is appropriate to the 
`logic of the situation´ whereas `irrational´ behaviour will consist of doing otherwise. 
However, Popper and several of his commentators have made an important distinction 
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between the `objectivist´ and the `subjectivist´ version of SA. According to them, in the 
former the theoretician seeks to reconstruct P-S `as it actually is´ whereas in the latter 
she reconstructs it `as it is seen by agents´. In this respect, we argued that the former is 
based on the (implicit) assumption that there is a systematic discrepancy between the 
theoretician´s and agents´ view of P-S and that, under the null hypothesis, this implies 
that agents´ view of P-S is assumed to be, at least partially, wrong. We also proposed a 
rationalization of the `objectivist´ version of SA according to which the latter is based 
on a methodological decision to assume that the mistakes made by agents when making 
decisions are less interesting for the purpose of understanding agents´ behaviour and, 
especially, for the generation of predictions than the (modelling) mistakes made by the 
theoretician.            
The purpose of this essay was to study the compatibility of these two apparently 
irreconcilable approaches. We have made five different claims. Our first claim was that 
there is a certain tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is analysed from the 
standpoint of the `rationality of the agents´ whose behaviour is captured in the model 
albeit the tension disappears when the relation is analysed from the standpoint of the 
`rationality of the theoretician´. Our second claim was that the nature of the tension 
between PTKL and SA depends on whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist´ or 
the `subjectivist´ version of SA. In particular, we argued that the tension between PTKL 
and the `subjectivist´ SA stems from the fact that, in the latter, it is implicitly assumed 
that agents´ view of P-S is partially wrong which implies, in turn, that agents do not 
`learn´ from their mistakes as PTKL posits, i.e., that they exhibit a tendency to repeat 
the same mistakes so that the latter become predictable. We argued that this feature of 
the `subjectivist´ version of SA creates a tension with PTKL when the main purpose of 
the theoretician is to generate predictions but does not generate any tension with PTKL 
when the purpose is to perform historical interpretation. This raises the difficult issue of 
the legitimacy of adopting the `subjectivist´ SA when the main purpose of the modelling 
exercise is to generate predictions the latter being understood as the derivation of the 
logical consequences of theory. It was not the purpose of this study to settle this issue 
and, hence, issuing a verdict on it will require further work. By contrast, we argued that 
the tension between PTKL and the `objectivist´ SA stems from the fact: (i) that if agents 
behave according to PTKL it is not necessarily the case that their decisions will be 
adequate or appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ insofar as the former only implies 
that agents tend to eliminate their mistakes and, hence, we have that in the wake of 
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changes in the surrounding environment agents´ decisions may not be adequate to the 
`logic of the (new) situation´, and (ii) that the adoption of the `objectivist´ SA implies de 
facto the imposition of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents´. Yet, we argued that 
it is unlikely that, if agents behave according to PTKL by subjecting their conjectures to 
trial and eliminating the ones that turn out to be wrong, their view of P-S will eventually 
converge to the theoretician´s. Our third claim built on the ideas of Hayek (1943) about 
the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences and was that, in the way it is presented by 
Popper and some of his commentators, the `objectivist´ SA represents a limit or extreme 
case based on the presupposition that P-S is (fully) independent of agents´ beliefs. Our 
fourth claim was closely related to the previous one and consisted of the idea that, if 
Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences are duly taken on board, 
it follows that the natural strategy for social scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as 
agents´ see it rather than to reconstruct it as the scientist sees it. Our fifth and last claim 
was that, unlike what Popper and his commentators suggest, the difference between the 
`objectivist´ and the `subjectivist´ version of SA is not that in the former the theoretician 
reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, 
rather, that in the former she reconstructs P-S as she sees it herself whereas in the latter 
she does it as she believes that agents actually see it. 
  
References 
 
Alchian, A. A. (1950) Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, Journal of 
Political Economy, 58(3), pp. 211-221.  
 
Arrow, K. J. (1986) Rationality of self and others in an economic system, Journal of 
Business, 59(4.2): S385-S399.   
 
Arrow, K. J. (2004) Is bounded rationality unboundedly rational? Some ruminations, in 
Augier, M. & March, J. G. (eds.) Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. 
Simon, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 47–55.   
Bartley, W. W. (1982) The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Part III. Rationality, Criticism, 
and Logic, Philosophia 11(1–2), pp. 121–221. 
 
Becker, G. (1962) Irrational behavior and economic theory, Journal of Political 
Economy, 70(1), pp. 1-13.    
 
Becker, G. S. (1976) The economic approach to human behaviour, Chicago (IL): 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 55
Beinhocker, E. D. (2013) Reflexivity, complexity, and the nature of social science. 
Journal of Economic Methodology, 20(4), pp. 330-342.  
 
Bentham ([1789] 1907) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Bicchieri, C. (1992) Two Kinds of Rationality, in de Marchi, N. (ed.) Post-Popperian 
Methodology of Economics: Recovering Practice, pp. 155-188, Boston: Kluwer Acade-
mic Publishers.  
 
Blaug, M. (1975) Kuhn versus Lakatos, or Paradigms versus Research Programmes in 
the History of Economics, History of Political Economy, 7, pp. 399–419. 
 
Blaug, M. (1985) Comment on D. Hands, ‘Karl Popper and economic methodology: a 
new look’, Economics and Philosophy, 1(2), pp. 286–8. 
 
Boland, L. A. (2003a) Dealing with Popper in Economic Methodology, Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences, 33(4), pp. 479-98. 
 
Boland, L. A. (2003b) The Foundations of Economic Method: A Popperian Perspective, 
2nd edition, London: Routledge.  
 
Bunge, M. (1996) The Seven Pillars of Popper´s Social Philosophy, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 26(4), pp. 528-556.  
 
Caldwell, B. J. (1985) Towards a broader conception of criticism, History of Political 
Economy, 18(4), pp. 675-81.  
 
Caldwell, B. J. (1991) Clarifying Popper, Journal of Economic Literature, 29(1), pp. 1-
33.  
 
Caldwell, B. J. (2003) Popper and Hayek: Who Influenced Whom? Cashiers 
D´Épistémologie, 292, 2003-01.  
 
Campbell, D. T. (1974) Evolutionary Epistemology, in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The 
Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 413-463, Vol. XIV, Book I, LaSalle (IL): Open Court.  
 
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994) Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Invisible Hand, American Economic Review, 84(2), pp. 327-32.  
 
De Bruin, B. (2006) Popper´s Conception of the Rationality Principle in the Social 
Sciences, in Jarvie, I., Minford, K. & Miller, D. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary 
Assessment, Vol. III (Science), pp. 209-217, Ashgate.  
 
Dow, S. C. (1995) The appeal of neoclassical economics: some insights from Keynes’s 
epistemology, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19(6), pp. 715-733.  
 
Edgeworth (1881) Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics 
to the Moral Sciences. Augustus M. Kelley: New York. 
 
 56
Farmer, M. K. (1982) Rational Action in Economic and Social Theory: Some 
Misunderstandings, Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 23(1), pp. 179-197.  
 
Farmer, J. D. (1998) Market force, ecology and evolution. Santa Fe Institute Working 
Paper. 
 
Friedman, M. (1953) The methodology of positive economics, in Essays in Positive 
Economics, ch. 1, pp. 3-43, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Gattei (2009) Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science, Routledge: New York. 
 
Gibbard, A. & Varian, H. R. (1978) Economic Models, Journal of Philosophy, 75(11), 
pp. 664-677. 
 
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1998) Rational Action for Sociology, British Journal of Sociology, 
49(2), pp. 167-192.  
 
Hamlin, A. P (1986) Ethics, Economics and the State, New York: St. Martin´s Press. 
Reprinted in Caldwell, B. (ed.), 1993, The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics I, 
pp. 304-362, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.    
 
Hands, D. W. (1985) Karl Popper and Economic Methodology: A New Look, 
Economics & Philosophy, 1(1), pp. 83-99.  
 
Hands, D. W. (1991) Popper, the rationality principle and economic explanation, in G. 
K. Shaw (ed.) Economics, Culture and Education: Essays in Honour of Mark Blaug, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 108-119.  
 
Hands, D. W. (1992) Falsification, Situational Analysis and Scientific Research 
Programs: The Popperian Tradition in Economic Methodology, in de Marchi, N. (ed.) 
Post-Popperian Methodology of Economics: Recovering Practice, pp. 19-54, Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Hayek, F. A. (1937) Economics and Knowledge, Economica, 4(13), pp. 33-54.  
 
Hayek, F. A. (1942) Scientism and the Study of Society. Part I, Economica, 9(35), pp. 
267-291.  
 
Hayek, F. A. (1943) The Facts of the Social Sciences, Ethics, 54(1), pp. 1-13. 
Hayek, F. A. (1967) Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hedström, P., Swedberg, R. & Udéhn, L. (1998) Popper´s Situational Analysis and 
Contemporary Sociology, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 28(3), pp. 339-364.  
 
Hicks, J. R. (1956) A Revision of Demand Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Hobbes, T. ([1651] 1985) Leviathan, London: Penguin Books.   
 
 57
Hume, D. ([1748] 2006) An enquiry concerning human understanding: a critical edition, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York : Oxford University Press. 
 
Jacobs, S. (1990) Popper, Weber and the Rationalist Approach to Social Explanation, 
British Journal of Sociology, 41(4), pp. 559-570.  
 
Kerstenetzky, C. L. (2009) Plural situational logic: the rationa(lisabi)lity principle, 
Cambrigde Journal of Economics, 33(2), pp. 193-209.  
 
Keynes, J. M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
Cambridge: Macmillan. 
 
Kirzner, I. (1976) The Economic Point of View, Kansas City: Sheed & Ward.  
 
Klappholz, K. & Agassi, J. (1959) Methodological Prescriptions in Economics, 
Economica, 26(101), February, pp. 60-74.  
 
Knight, F. H. ([1921] 1971) Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Koertge, N. (1975) Popper’s Metaphysical Research Program for the Human Sciences, 
Inquiry, 18(4), pp. 437-62. 
 
Koertge, N. (1979) The Methodological Status of Popper´s Rationality Principle, 
Theory and Decision, 10(1/4), January, pp. 83-95.  
 
Lagueux, M. (1993) Popper and the Rationality Principle, Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 23(4), pp. 468-480.  
 
Lagueux, M. (2006) Popper and the Rationality Principle, in Jarvie, I., Minford, K. & 
Miller, D. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Vol. III (Science), pp. 197-217, 
Ashgate.  
 
Lagueux, M. (2010) Rationality and Explanation in Economics, Routledge.  
 
Langlois, R. N. (1995) Rationality, institutions, and explanation, in R. N. Langlois (ed.) 
Economics as a Process, pp. 225-255, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Langlois, R. N. (1998) Rule-following, Expertise, and Rationality: A New Behavioral 
Economics? in Dennis, K. (ed.) Rationality in Economics: Alternative Perspectives, pp. 
55-78, Boston: Kluwer Academic.   
 
Latsis, S. J. (1972) Situational Determinism in Economics, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Sciences, 23(3), pp. 207-245.  
 
Latsis, S. J. (1983) The Role and Status of the Rationality Principle in the Social 
Sciences, in Cohen, R. S. & Wartoksky, M. W. (eds.) Epistemology, Methodology, and 
the Social Sciences, pp. 123-152, London: Reidel Publishing Company.  
 
 58
Loasby, B. J. (1976) Choice, complexity and Ignorance: An Enquiry into Economic 
Theory and the Practice of Decision-Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Loasby, B. J. (1999) Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics, London: 
Routledge.    
 
Lucas, R. E. (1986) Adaptive behaviour and economic theory, in R. M. Hogarth & M. 
W. Reder (eds.) Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology, 
pp. 217-242, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Matzner, E. & Jarvie, I. C. (1998) Introduction to the Special Issues on Situational 
Analysis, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 28(3), pp. 333-338.  
 
Mayr, E. (1988) Toward a New Philosophy of Biology – Observations of an 
Evolutionist. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Menger, C. ([1871] 1950) Principles of Economics, translated and edited by J. Dingwall 
& Bert H. Hoslitz. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.  
 
Merton, R. K. (1948) The self-fulfilling prophecy, Antioch Review, 8(2), pp. 193-210. 
Mill, J. S. ([1836] 1967) On the Definition of Political Economy and the Method of 
Investigation Proper to It, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 4, pp. 309-39, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
 
Minsky, H. P. (1975) John Maynard Keynes. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Muth, J. F. (1961) Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, 
Econometrica, 29(3), pp. 315-335.  
 
Nadeau, R. (1993) Confuting Popper on the Rationality Principle, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 23(4), pp. 446-467.  
 
Notturno, M. A. (1998) Truth, Rationality, and the Situation, Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 28(3), pp. 400-421.  
 
Oakley, A. (1999) Economics and the origin of Popper´s situational analysis, History of 
Economics Review, 30, pp. 25-40.  
 
Oakley, A. (2002) Popper´s Ontology of Situated Human Action, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 32(4), pp. 455-486.  
 
Pareto, V. (1917) Traitè de sociologie generale, Payot: Lausanne and Paris.  
 
Parsons, T. (1937) The Structure of Social Action, McGraw Hill: New York.  
 
Popper, K. R. ([1943a] 1966) The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, London: 
Poutledge & Kegan.  
 
 59
Popper, K. R. ([1943b] 1966) The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, London: 
Poutledge & Kegan.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1944-45) The Poverty of Historicism I-III, Economica, 11, pp. 86-103, 
119-137, 12: pp. 69-89.    
 
Popper, K. R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1966) Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality 
of and the Freedom of Man, St. Louis: Washington University Press.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1967) La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité, in E. M. 
Classen (ed.), Les Fondements Philosophiques des Systèmes Economiques, pp. 142-50, 
Paris: Payot.   
 
Popper, K. R. (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1976a) Unended Quest, LaSalle, IL.: Open Court.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1976b) The Logic of the Social Sciences, in T. W. Adorno et al., The 
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, pp. 87-104, London: Heinemann.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1985) The Rationality Principle, in D. Miller (ed.) Popper Selections, pp. 
357-365, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1990) A World of Propensities, Bristol (UK): Thoemmes.  
 
Popper, K. R. (1994) The Myth of the Framework: In defence of science and rationality, 
London: Routledge.   
 
Sassower, R. (2006) Popper´s Legacy: Rethinking Politics, Economics and Science, 
Stocksfield (UK): Acumen.  
 
Savage, L. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.  
Schumpeter, J. A. (1984) The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140(4), pp. 577-593.  
 
Schutz, A. (1972) The Phenomenology of the Social World, London: Heinnemann.  
 
Simon, H. A. (1976) From Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in Spiro J. Latsis (ed.) 
Method and Appraisal in Economics, pp. 129-148, Cambrigde: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Twomey, P. (1998) Reviving Veblenian Psychology, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
22(4), pp. 433-48. 
 
 60
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1986) Rational choices and the Framing of Decisions, in 
R. M. Hogarth & M. W. Reder (eds.) Rational Choice: The Contrast between 
Economics and Psychology, pp. 67-94, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Vanberg, V. J. (2002) Rational Choice vs. Program-based Behaviour: Alternative 
Theoretical Approaches and their Relevance for the Study of Institutions, Rationality 
and Society, 14(7), pp. 7-54. 
 
Volz, K. H. & Gigerenzer. G. (2012) Cognitive processes in decisions under risk are not 
the same as in decisions under uncertainty, Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6(1), pp. 1-6.  
 
von Mises, L. (1944) The Treatment of “Irrationality” in the Social Sciences, 
Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, 4(4), pp. 527-546.  
 
von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1947) Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, 
Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.  
 
Vromen, J. J. (1995) Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New 
Institutional Economics, London: Routledge.  
 
Weber, M. (1904-5) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Allen & 
Unwin.     
 
Weber, M. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York: Free Press.  
 
Wible, J. R. (1984/85) An epistemic critique of rational expectations and the 
neoclassical macroeconomics research program, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, 
7(2), pp. 269-81.  
 
Zouboulakis, M. S. (2014) The Varieties of Economic Rationality: From Adam Smith to 
contemporary behavioural and evolutionary economics, Routledge.  
 
 
